Can the Doing of Phenomenology be learned?

by

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Do not hesitate to share this booklet with colleagues and especially students. Comments and suggestions for improvement welcome!

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URL for online free e-book:
To my fondly remembered friend,
Herbert Spiegelberg,
whose work is echoed here,
this text is dedicated.
Introduction

Given the thousands of bibliographical items, there can be no doubt that skill at interpreting phenomenological texts can be learned. But phenomenology is not the interpretation of texts, but rather the reflective observation, analysis, and eidetic description of phenomena, which is to say mental or intentive processes and things-as-intended-to or encountered in them, and there are not anywhere near thousands of items of this sort and this despite methodological descriptions in such works as Edmund Husserl’s *Ideen* (1913). One can wonder why.

Given the examples of not only the *Ideen* but also *Sein und Zeit* (1927), *L'être et le néant* (1943), *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945), *Le Deuxième Sexe* (1949), etc., the hesitations out of modesty on the part of us who are not giants in our tradition to attempt actually to produce phenomenology in such large works are understandable. But there is the alternative of attempting to compose concise efforts of ca. 3,000 words in a genre that I call “reflective analysis.” To avoid confusion with scholarship, such analyses ought to have little or no mention of authorities, few if any references to literature, rare footnotes, rare quotations, etc. But they should include clarification of key terminology and carefully selected examples. Above all, an “RA” is about some of the things themselves.

My hope is that study of reflective analyses will motivate in the student some reflective observation of the things themselves that are referred to, i.e., some phenomena, and beyond that even the attempt to verify the descriptions and, where such analyses are found false to correct them phenomenologically and where they are found incomplete to extend them, again phenomenologically. By such efforts an individual working alone can, I believe, improve his or her skill at reflection (I believe that all normal adults already have some skill at reflecting on their own and other mental lives), but I also believe that this improvement can be accomplished through teaching in which students study a reflective analysis on their own and then meet with a teacher who proceeds in a Socratic fashion. The paragraphs in the chapters of this booklet are numbered to facilitate discussion in classes.

And as one’s skill and confidence increase, one should attempt to compose one’s own reflective analyses and share them with sympathetic colleagues. The present modest collection is of that sort. I am the author of the ten RAs here and encourage copying of this collection for students and interested colleagues. *These*
RAs were originally written for different occasions and have major overlaps in content so that the chapters can be taught separately and I hope this is not too distracting. The first two chapters are more extensive than the others and it might be fun to go back and study them again after the rest have been worked through.

I am certainly not the only person who has tried actually to do phenomenology. Hence, let me ask the reader to send me not only any new RAs that he or she has written, but also any RAs found in the work of others (and not just in the giants of our past), and this can be in languages other than English because teaching is done in the local language, which RAs in the local language might help. My ambition is to publish more collections, especially those by others.

As the reader may know, I have already published two texts containing RAs, which might also be used (the asterisks below designate publications available through Amazon.com and/or Kindle):


How to order paperback as well as electronic versions of these books from Zeta Books is described at the end of this volume.

Lester Embree
Delray Beach, October 2012
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I.

What is Reflective Analysis?

1. “Reflective analysis” is another name for phenomenology, a school of thought begun in 1900 by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl wanted to develop a metaphysics or first philosophy that was a strict science and that hence deserved to be an “-ology,” but “reflective analysis” better conveys initially what phenomenology is as an approach that can be taken in many disciplines.

2. In this time when most so-called phenomenology is actually scholarship on texts, there is need not only for understanding of but also improved skill in this approach because it is the way in which phenomenological claims can be assessed as well as phenomenological investigation advance.

3. In the present essay I attempt to show something of what this general approach is. While most writing in or on phenomenology is addressed by professionals only to fellow professionals in philosophy, I am also addressing
professionals in other disciplines as well as college students who are not committed to a discipline and I am not presupposing any knowledge of philosophy. Maybe this introductory sketch can be usefully discussed in classes and my numbering the paragraphs will help that. But some of the issues raised may be unfamiliar to professors as well.

4. Little existing technical terminology is used here. Instead, I will introduce a number of technical expressions as I proceed, usually but not always setting them off with so-called “scare quotes.” These technical expressions are usually developed from ordinary words and clarified with examples. Well done reflective analyses include good examples.

5. To begin with, let us suppose that we are in an attitude in which what is depicted in the photo above can be described as the corner of a room with a picture on the wall above an unmade bed. The walls, bed, bedclothes, pillows, and picture are cultural objects that can obviously be described in much more detail. But then, by a familiar change of attitude, we can recognize that the attitude we have just started put in is a straightforward or, perhaps better, an “unreflective” attitude, one in which we overlook, as it were, a great deal, including (a) the “manner of givenness” whereby how what is in the illustration above is predominantly seen visually and not touched but still encountered as tangible, (b) that the scene, which is part of a larger situation, is seen through “appearances” such that if we moved closer or backed away, the picture on the wall would appear larger or smaller but the picture itself would be believed to remain of the same size, (c) that the picture has some positive aesthetic value and the rumpled bedclothes are a little ugly, and (d) the unmade bed calls for volitional action to make it up.

6. The attitude in which we can observe and describe such previously overlooked “things” (in the signification whereby anything is a thing) can be called “reflective.” And the resort to this second attitude makes it possible to say, as I have done, that the bed, walls, etc. are predominantly seen, that they are seen through visual appearances, that they have various values for us, and that we are disposed to act on something in this situation.

7. By a different angle of reflection while looking at the corner of the room depicted, we can recognize “correlations” whereby there is (a) visual perceiving, (b) valuing, and (c) possible willing in relation to that which has just been distinguished and, furthermore, there are, from a third angle of reflection, the unreflective and reflective attitudes, among other things such as dispositions, that
we can also easily enough recognize. Then again, where visual perceiving is concerned, it is different from the auditory perceiving that would be lived through if a ball was thrown against the wall and bounced on the bed and then the floor, but this is a only a possibility like the tactual perceiving that we would have had if we ran our hand down the wall and not something actualized. Furthermore, the “experiencing” that is actualized in this case is one in which the “thing-as-experienced” in it as well as it itself occur in what is best called the “now” (because then the word “present” will be used for a different descriptive purpose below) and they are best characterized as “perceptual.”

8. Perceptual experiencing contrasts, on the one hand, with “recollecting” and, on the other hand, with “expecting” where real things are concerned. (“Real things” are in time while “ideal things,” such as the significations of words, are not, but nothing more needs to be said about ideal things in the present chapter.) In recollectional experiencing, the experiencing observably goes on in the now while what is experienced in it is in the past, and in expectational experiencing, what is expected is normally a possibility in the future, while the expecting if it also observably goes on in the now.

9. Besides the three species of experiencing of real things just distinguished, there were the differences alluded to between positive and negative valuing and also between inactual and actualized perceivings and willings correlative to different aspects of the scene in the corner of our room depicted above. Valuing and willing and, for that matter, believing are species of what is best called “positing.” More generally, experiencings and positings are kinds of components in what are best called “encounterings.” One might be tempted to use “experiencing” in a broad signification to cover all of these components, but using “encountering” this way leaves “experiencing” free to cover perceiving, recollecting, and expecting specifically and to contrast with believing, valuing, and willing as species of positing.

10. Hearers and readers of this essay should be able to find and observe whether the things described thus far are as I have described them. The descriptions are based on what is best called “reflective observation,” which has the three angles also described, and correlatively the encounterings, things-as-encountered, and attitudes of encountering are reflectively-observationally verifiable. A brief classificatory outline can summarize our findings thus far (the things-as-encountered can be added if one wishes):
ENCOUNTERINGS
I. Positings
   A. Willings
   B. Valuings
   C. Believings
II. Experiencings (of realities)
   A. Expectings
   B. Recollectings
   C. Perceivings

11. Three questions might now lead the hearer or reader to look further for herself into what has been sketched thus far:

   (1) In recollecting and expecting respectively, can one merely notice only things things-as-previous-encountered and things-as-to-be-encountered or must one also notice the past and future encounterings and attitudes of encountering correlative with them?

   (2) It is fairly easy to recognize that valuings are not only positive and negative but also sometimes neutral; e.g., while our picture might be somewhat handsome and the rumpled bedclothes somewhat ugly, the wall in the corner of the room may have neither positive nor negative in value for us. If that is so, are there the same three analogous “modalities,” as they can be called, to willing and believing?

   (3) In traditional thinking, the imagination is considered a mental faculty on a par with sensation, memory, emotion, volition, etc. I believe this is false. Can we not only pretend to see a second picture to the right on the wall in our illustration, but also pretend to remember eating something for lunch yesterday that we cannot seriously remember eating, pretend to like somebody we do not like, pretend to do something like waving our arms in the air above our heads that we are not seriously doing? If so, then is there not a “fictive” version for each species of “serious” positing and experiencing distinguished above and imagination is not on a par with the other faculties?

12. Thus far, we have seen that reflective analysis can focus on encounterings, things-as-encountered, and attitudes of encountering. Now we can
widen the scope of our reflective observing. Still reflectively observing our predominantly visual perceiving of the corner of the room, we may produce a series of slightly different encounterings that vary with respect to what is paid attention to or, better, “focused on” in them. Thus we can focus on the picture, focus on how the two walls form a corner, focus on the slatted headboard, focus on one pillow, focus on the other, focus on the pile of sheets and blankets, and finally focus on the mattress. This is seven focusings. Despite their similarities, the most striking thing about them is that they form a temporal sequence within what seems best called “mental life.” Each of them goes on for a short while and is followed by another that does so as well.

13. Sometimes these perceiving that differ with respect to the focusing within them are called “mental processes,” a fairly neutral expression that can then be suitably modified, but I prefer to call them “encounterings” because that expression immediately raises the questions of what it is that is encountered and how. The seven focally different encounterings are encounterings of things beyond or, better, “outwardly transcendent of” the stream of mental life in which they successively occur. This is as interesting as it is obvious. Also interesting, however, is how these encounterings encounter one another within or, better, “immanently in” mental life. Where an encountering immanently encounters an encountering in its future, it can be said to be “protentive to it” and where it immanently encounters an encountering in its past, it can be said to be “retrotentive to it.”

14. “Protentiveness” and “retrotentiveness” are species of a remarkable property that Husserl followed his teacher Franz Brentano in calling “Intentionalität,” and I prefer to follow my teacher (and Husserl’s disciple) Dorion Cairns in calling “intentiveness.”¹ Perhaps we first find how encounterings occurring in the now are intentive to things transcendent of mental life, such as the pillows on the bed. There is nothing else like it. But one might be helped to find what is referred to with this word by considering how encounterings in first approximation “meaningfully point” to the things encountered in them.

15. Objection to a mistake may help the hearer or reader of this essay focus on intentiveness. Many thinkers have contended down through the ages that there

¹ For a reflective analysis by Cairns that goes beyond the present essay and describes intentive syntheses of several sorts, see Dorion Cairns: “The Theory of Intentionality in Husserl,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 32 (1999): 116-124.
are so-called “memory images” such that when one recollects a scene from one’s youth, there is actually an image in the now along with the recollecting and this image then represents the past scene. But when we reflect, we do not find such images and we can then wonder why such things are believed in. But what one does find reflectively is the recollecting occurring in the now, the past scene-as-recollected in the past, and that the recollecting is intentive to events in the past. It may sometimes be useful to refer to the intentive encountering as a “noesis” (the adjective is “noetic”) and the thing-as-encountered as a “noema” (the adjective is “noematic”) as Husserl did. Then there is noetic reflecting, noematic reflecting, and straightforward recollecting. Worse than the memory-image theory of recollection is the theory of perception whereby we somehow have representations between the perceiving and the “real” thing perceived, which is a matter of colorless photons. (Perhaps photons exist and are causes but not objects of seeing.)

16. Now let me describe how a diagram might be constructed in which the things just analyzed might be sorted out, but I leave it to the hearers or readers of this essay to construct the diagram. First, one can represent encounterings with short vertical lines with arrow heads pointing up to things transcendent of the stream of mental life and to the left and right to represent retrotentiveness and protentiveness (the attitude could be indicated at the tail of the vertical arrow, but that is not needed now):

17. Second, one can draw horizontal lines to represent the banks, so to speak, of the stream of mental life and include our seven encounterings in sequence within the stream and intentive to one another as well as to transcendent things such the mess of bedclothes in our picture.
18. And third, our stream can then be considered to flow out of the future on the right through the now and off into the past to the left. (We “naturally” take this temporal flow as part of the spatio-temporality of experienced nature, but this is a belief that can be questioned.)

19. With the approach as well as the concepts now introduced, the hearer or reader of this essay may recognize that it is possible to conduct investigations in the old-fashioned way that William James called introspective in 1890. Actually much else can be developed from here, but a requirement for an introspective or, better, phenomenological psychology can be begun with.

20. In most but not all of the above exposition, the second person (“we” and “our”) has been used. This was not merely a matter of style. The scene of the bed, wall, picture, etc. is originally for us objective or, since that word is overloaded with connotations, we can rather say that it is “public.” In other words, it is seen by or at least visible to more than one person. There is then the fascinating matter of how the persons encountering or able to encounter the scene also experience one another and thus form an intersubjectivity or, less technically speaking, a group that shares in the encountering. Thus, “we” encounter the corner of the room. Until I discover that my friend looking at the corner of my room with me appreciates the bedclothes and the picture differently than I do, I presume she does so in the same way that I do and vice versa. And if I learn that we have reverse preferences, they nevertheless are intensive to the same basic things, but with opposite values. My friend is transcendent of my stream of mental life, but even so we have a common or shared mental life within which there is species of experiencing of one another that can be reflectively discerned.

21. But if one recognizes that we originally begin in an attitude in which we share public things, the question can arise of whether there is an alternative to this attitude. The answer is that this “intersubjective attitude” can be “reduced” to an “egological attitude.” Then all other things are considered only in relation to a single person and can be called by contrast “private.” My friend goes, it may be said, from being a “co-subject” to being another object for me. We can then ask not only how what is depicted in the picture of the corner of my room appears just to me but also how it appears to just my friend or to just any individual person.

22. I believe such an egological reduction is necessary for psychological investigation and this thus investigations of individual others as well as one’s individual self. Too often it seems that phenomenologists believe that reflective
analysis is confined to self-observation in the egological attitude, but this is a mistake. Not only is there individual other-observation as well as individual self-observation, but there can be observation of groups and groups are fundamental in the social and historical sciences rather than the individuals investigated in psychology. Perhaps this comment suffices to suggest that we can start from what is analyzed in Part I above and go on to engage in the philosophy or theory of science. To have objectivity of scientific results, we must return from the egological to the intersubjective attitude.

23. Another brief description may be submitted for the hearer or reader’s examination at this point in the exposition. In the seeing of the pillow on the bed, we can recognize that in our perceiving there is a side facing us and recognize that it is intended to in the “presentive” component of our experiencing and that the side facing away from us is “appresented.” What we perceive is a pillow with not only the mentioned “outsides,” but also “insides.” Without cutting the pillow open to have the inside presented, we can simply turn it over so that one appresented outside becomes presented while the formerly presented side becomes appresented. On this basis and without going into the question of how it is originally established, we can go on to say that another person’s body, including postures, gestures, products, etc., appresents her mental life, although in this case there is no standpoint for us from which the appresented can become presented as it can always be presented for her.

24. Something should also to be said about the illustration used here. For me in writing this essay it is directly perceived, as is also the encounterings that have been described. But for the hearer or reader of this essay, it is of course a photograph and our descriptions are words and I have been taking advantage of how we are skilled at focusing not on the representations in such cases but on what is represented. When reflectively analyzed, “representational experiencing” can be observed to have a stratified structure such that the infrastratum is intentive to the representation (the word or depiction) and the superstratum is intentive to the thing that the representation represents. Thus it can be said overall to be an indirect experiencing even though this structure is overlooked. And this, like the other descriptions offered here, should be confirmed, corrected if needed, and extended by the hearer or reader through her own reflective analysis.

25. Something should now also be said about attitudes and beginning from those introduced at the outset of this essay. The unreflective as well as the
reflective attitudes can both be called “contemplative” or “observational” because in them we simply look and report what we see. As such they contrast with two other kinds of attitude in which there are also species. The most fundamental kind of attitude is “practical” and is as such concerned with what happens, often seeking to influence it but sometimes merely seeking to let something happen. While thinking and experiencing predominate in contemplative attitudes, volition or willing predominates in practical attitudes. A third kind of attitude has valuing predominating in it and might be called the attitude of “enjoyment” or recreation. How these three kinds of attitude might be specified is another exercise that the hearer or reader might want to employ reflective analysis to perform.

26. Some remarks might be made, finally, about mental lives and the world. What is traditionally called in phenomenology the “natural attitude” seems better called the “worldly attitude” because, while nature is no doubt fundamental, there is more to the world than nature and what is prominent to begin with is how the world is “socio-cultural.” This signifies that the world contains cultural objects such as the bed in the corner of my room, which have values and uses, and also persons and non-human as well as human animals. In the worldly attitude we believe that there is one big system of things related fundamentally in spatial, temporal, and causal relations and this system includes mental lives, which have at least causal relations with other things, our bodies immediately and other things mediatedly.

27. Husserl and his closest followers do not accept that there is no alternative to the worldly attitude and correlative deny that everything is always only something “in the world.” They hold that while reflecting on mental life we can temporarily suspend belief in or neutralize our believing in the in-the-world status of mental life and, while this alternative “transcendental attitude” is maintained, mental life is non-worldly and can serve the grounding function needed in transcendental first philosophy. Like much else, one can pursue this matter through reflective analysis, but I said at the outset that I would assume no knowledge of philosophy. I hope that colleagues in other disciplines will see different non-philosophical employments of the approach here called “reflective analysis.”
II.

Recollection on Others

1.—The complex issue of the Other or—better—“Others” has long been thematic in phenomenology. Alfred Schutz, for example, was especially concerned with how Others interpreted their own actions, themselves, one another, their actions, their groups, their products, and their situations. In contrast, Edmund Husserl focused on how Others are originally constituted by a self through sense-transfer and appresentation in primary passivity. The theme of the present analysis can be located between the concerns of Husserl and Schutz. It will simply be assumed that we always already do encounter Others and that we can abstractively set aside how Others interpret their own actions, products, etc. Instead, the concern here is with whether, and in what respects, Others can be reflectively observed at all. The significance of this question should become clearer as the exposition proceeds.

2.—The word “Others” is here intended to refer not only to separate individuals, but also to groups; moreover, it refers not only to human but also to nonhuman animals. “Observation” can be straightforward or reflective. In straightforward observation, no notice is taken by the I of her own encounterings of things, of things-as-encountered, or of herself. Rather, one exclusively thematizes things. In some traditions of philosophy and science, it is a matter of course that observation is straightforward, and this can make it difficult to learn to reflect. In Other traditions, including that of phenomenology, reflection is central to the approach. The very thematization, analysis, and description of the difference between straightforward or “self-oblivious” observation on the one hand and reflective observation on the Other itself already require reflection.

3.—Most reflection in the history of phenomenology is self-observation, where the encounterings and things-as-encountered belong to the same stream of mental life as the reflecting on them. But this is not the only type of reflection. Here the concern is with “reflections on Others” where “reflection” does not automatically signify that what is reflected on must belong to the same mental stream as the “reflecting.” Instead, what makes observation in general “reflective” is its thematization of what are technically called noetico-noematic correlations. By means of self-observation, one can observe how one oneself encounters things and, correlative, how things are encountered as-they-are-encountered-by-oneself. In contrast, reflection on Others focuses on how Others encounter things, and correlative, on things as-encountered-by-them. Hence there are two species of reflection. The Others reflectively observed can themselves be either
straightforwardly self-oblivious or self-reflective, or they can themselves be reflecting on Others—including, for example, someone who is herself reflectively observing them in turn. And this too may be ascertained through reflection on Others.

4.—Due to centuries of representationalism in modern philosophy, some may be reluctant to recognize even the feasibility of reflection on Others. But anyone who has taught classes has recognized whether students are paying attention or else daydreaming, attending to something else in the room (such as another student), etc. More subtly, those who are attending to what one is trying to teach them can be observed to be (a) understanding, (b) not understanding, (c) undergoing the transition from not understanding to understanding, or (d) becoming increasingly perplexed!

5.—Before turning to what one can seek most generally to observe reflectively in Others, something needs to be said about what is being abstractively set aside here—namely, one’s own and Other’s interpretations—as well as about the observation of Others that is left untouched by this abstraction. How is the latter itself to be characterized? Other-observation presupposes the encountering of Others that occurs most clearly whenever living beings (especially those with organs of sensation and movement) are perceived or remembered. When such things are directly experienced, i.e., presented, psyches are appresented “in” them, and the immediately experienced things are apprehended as the somas or organisms that are (to a greater or lesser extent) under the sway of these Other psyches.² There is more to such primary encountering of Others, but only one further point needs to be made here, which is that such primary encountering occurs automatically. In Other words, one’s I is not engaged in performing this process of appresenting—and indeed she cannot engage in it.

6.—In contrast, the observation here called reflection on Others is a type of secondary encountering. It is originally an operation in which an I is engaged, although it can become a habitual or even, for specifiable groups (e.g., psychiatrists) a traditional type of encountering. It has the same presentive/appresentive structure as the primary encountering; thus one can distinguish the Other’s soma and psyche, and to some extent, one can even thematize her soma as it presents itself to her, something physicians sometimes do. As a rule, however, what one focuses on in Other-observation is the Other psyche. More will be said

² It may be noted that Husserl’s expression, Einfühlung, which is literalistically rendered in English as “empathy,” is being avoided here. This is because phenomenologists have been heard who have slid from the technical signification, which is essentially cognitive, to the ordinary and predominantly affective-valuational signification by which one empathizes through feelings for an Other’s feelings.
about this form of observation presently. First the question of the Other’s self-
interpretations must be considered.

7.—Understanding Others through their own interpretations of their actions,
selves, products, etc., is actually a rather reliable approach, one that many in the
cultural disciplines regularly employ in the course of participant observation and
the study of speeches and texts. But one can wonder whether an Other is
mendacious, self-deceived, or merely inept at self-observation and self-reporting.
To be a polite person entails mild lying about various trivial things, and many
occupations—e.g., selling used cars—requires greater skill at deception. That one
may deceive oneself is too elaborate a problem to be addressed on this occasion.
Finally, skill at observation of oneself, one’s encounterings, and one’s things-as-
encountered varies considerably (and even some *soi-disant* phenomenologists do
not seem to do it well).

8.—But if one thus questions the reliability of self-reports and the self-
interpretations expressed in them, how can one settle the questions and be able to
assert, as has just been done, that the understanding of Others through their self-
interpretations is actually rather reliable? One basis for this reliability is, of course,
the internal consistency of the self-reports. Another is the conformity of self-
interpretations with common sense. The crucial way, however, is how these reports
accord with what one can non-interpretatively observe through reflection on
Others, e.g., is somebody who says she is not angry observably angry or not? This
is a decisive basis for recognizing mendacity, self-deception, etc. (as well as
recognizing honesty—with oneself as well as with Others—and also any well-
developed skills at self-interpretation).

9.—Another consideration is relevant here. The self-reports by Others are
expressed in one or another language. Those who read more than one language
already know that languages are not isomorphic. One may well believe that the
main things about encounterings and things-as-encountered can still be expressed
in ordinary vernaculars. Nevertheless, one can be misled by ordinary language and
it is often desirable to develop technical terminology in order to be able to express
descriptions that fellow phenomenologists might seek to verify.

10.—A set of terms refined chiefly through self-observation can now be used
to guide reflection on Others abstracted from common-sense interpretations. First
of all, there is need for a most general concept and expression for that which
reflective observation is thematically concerned. Husserl’s word is *Erlebnis*, which
is often rendered in French as *vécu* and which is rendered in Castilian as *vivencia*.
In English, those in the analytical tradition seem to prefer “mental act,” which is
problematical since most of the processes in question are passive, while in the
phenomenological tradition some use “experience,” while Others use “lived
experience,” which raises the question of what an un-lived experience might be.
Dorion Cairns first used “awareness” to translate Erlebnis, then “subjective process”—which he considered his greatest mistake—and finally preferred “mental process” for translations and “intentive process” for his own investigations.

11. However, the general expression used here is “encountering.” It connotes a process and intimates that something is encountered. In addition, it is easily specified not only as cognitive encountering, but also valutational encountering, and volitional encountering, which is desirable if intellectualism is to be avoided (intellectualism here connoting a habitual focus on experiencing, thinking, and believing while relatively disregarding valuing and willing). “Encountering” expresses a general concept and can be qualified for more specific concepts and expressions. Nevertheless, it is crucial to remember that only encounterings are concrete while words like “remembering,” “willing,” etc. refer to abstract components within them.

12. It is also crucial to remember that every encountering necessarily includes all of the basic components. Thus to call an encountering a perceiving, for example, emphasizes its type of experiencing (i.e., of present things and direct rather than indirect things) and de-emphasizes the believing, valuing, and willing also included in the encountering. Real things-as-encountered are always either perceived, remembered, expected, or represented and—at least in some modes—are also believed in, valued, and willed. It is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness to think, for example, that things-as-perceived and their correlative perceivings are concrete rather than abstract noematic and noetic components of encounters.

13. The most general division among components within encounterings is between “positionality” on the one hand and what can be called “experiencing” on the Other. In fact, another advantage of the word “encountering” as the most general term is that it leaves “experiencing” free to express a narrower concept. “Experiencing” can even be used technically for encountering ideal things such as numbers and universal essences, which is a kind of “direct experiencing,” while “indirect experiencing” is intentive to its things on the basis of representations that may be indicational, pictorial, or linguistic. The original encountering of and reflection on Others are both indirect, although one is not always explicitly conscious of this. Experiencing has such a wealth of types and aspects that the traditional preoccupation with it is understandable, even though unfortunate.

14. It is unfortunate because positionality is equally important and thus ought not to be disregarded or underemphasized. The most obvious species of positionality seems to be the affective-valutational. Colloquially, this is a matter of liking, disliking, loving, hating, apathy, etc. Such expressions often connote irrationality, and the phenomena only began to be intensively analyzed in Western philosophy during the 18th century. Hence it seems wise to adopt the artificial
expression of “valuing.” Like believing, valuing can be positive, negative, or neutral, and there are correlative positive, negative, and neutral values discernable in the things-as-encountered. And all three sorts of positionality have various degrees of firmness in their positive and negative modes, i.e., positive or negative resoluteness and hesitancy in willing, certainty and conjecture in believing, as well as firm and shaky valuing.

15.—How can this taxonomy be used as a guide in reflection on Others? Questions can be derived from it about what might be reflectively observed in the encounterings and things-as-encountered in Others, collective as well as individual and nonhuman as well as human. The most effective way quickly to establish possibilities is to describe examples. This sketch is only a beginning. Deeper investigation ought to be able to produce more refined descriptions.

16.—While one can abstractively discern components of the sorts just listed within encounterings and things-as-encountered, it is not as if encounterings are devoid of inherent differences. The best word to use in recognizing the main differences among encounterings is “predominance.” Thus sometimes a concrete encounter is predominantly volitional, and on that account is properly called a willing. This does not signify that there are not also components of believing and valuing in the encounter, which there are, but only that the volitional component predominates. Analogously, perceiving may predominate within the experiencing component, but some remembering and expecting also occur along with it subordinately.

17.—Several examples pertaining to a nonhuman animal may be useful at this point. Speaking personally now, I had a dog when I was a boy. When I came home from school each day, it was plain to me and to my family and friends that he was happy to see me. I can now say that we encountered the encountering of me that occurred in my dog’s psyche on the occasions of my return. Our encountering of his psyche had a foundation in our sensuous perceiving of his noises and movements. The type of positionality that predominated in his encountering of me was valutational and its mode was positive. It was also clear that I was what was valued by him and that I had positive value for him. Then again, I can recall being sick in bed once while I had my dog. I do not recall what the illness was but I do recall that the house was kept quiet and the doctor came repeatedly. Moreover, I recall that my dog was sad. This was readily appresented in his posture and movements. In this case, his attitude toward the situation centered on me was valutational and negative.

18.—Where the experiencing components in the encounterings are concerned, both of these cases were perceptual in the broad signification of perceiving as experiencing of things in the present (a signification that includes apperceiving). Yet it was not solely perceptual because the perceiving was
accompanied by the positive and negative valuing. It might have been that my
dog’s encountering of me was more expectational than perceptual when I arrived
home, my dog “looking forward” to being greeted, to having his ears scratched,
and going out to play. This was manifested in his running back and forth from me
to the door.

19.—As for encountering my dog recollecting, I can recall cases when he
and I returned after an absence to a familiar place and he went on something of a
joint tour of inspection to see, it seemed, if anything had changed. This would
seem to involve remembering as a basis for recognition of the presence or absence
of the expected and familiar, but it is not a matter of attending, in recollectional
operations, to past events in the same way that I do in recollecting my past
encounterings. With humans, however, there are indeed times when the Other is
encountered as recollecting, which is to say actively remembering, as well as times
when she has past events impose themselves on her attention. In both cases, there
is a decline if not cessation of attention to aspects of the current situation;
moreover, the attention that we encounter in the Other at such times often seems to
lack the continuing purposefulness that accompanies deliberation about possible
actions.

20.—The sketched facts were primary encounterings of Others in the past
and then reflections on them in recollection. For the purposes of establishing
possibilities, it is sufficient if hearers or readers of this essay can feign cases of
these sorts, which signifies that they pretend to remember having encountered such
things or even that they pretend currently to encounter them. Also, the descriptions
are quite general; they involve the encounters apperceived in Others, their
fundamental types and modes of positionality, and the concurrent types of
experiencing. Nuanced detail is not needed when the question has to do merely
with the possibility of reflection on Others (which is not to say that greater
specificity cannot be attained with more effort and under suitable circumstances).

21.—If enough has now been said to establish that one can encounter—and
on that basis observe—valuing and experiencing in Others, nonhuman as well as
human, what of the Other species of positionality? Can one reflectively obser

22.—For analysis there are the modalities already mentioned, e.g., some
willing is positive, which includes being supportive of what Others do, some is
undermining, and there can be destructive as well as creative willing. Perhaps the
most interesting mode of predominantly volitional encountering that we can
reflectively observe in Others is volitional neutrality, e.g., the Other is resolved not to take sides or, as it is said, not to get involved. This seems usually combined with apathy in the valuational component.

23.—What about believing? Once one is in a theoretical attitude of self-observation, it may seem that believing along with the experiencing that it is as a rule founded upon and motivated by are the most conspicuous things in encountering. But this may be a product of intellectualism, if not naturalism. If one resists the tendency among many educated people in the practical as well as theoretical disciplines today to disregard (or underemphasize) not only valuing and values, but also willing and the correlative uses or practical characteristics in the things-as-encountered, if, in Other words, one abides by things as the cultural things they originally are, then believing is merely one of the three main types of positionality in a concrete cultural encountering.

24.—And as for believings as encountered in Other humans, I again consider it something obvious that these Others are at times encountered as certain and at Other times as dubitive, and that these degrees of assurance occur in negative as well as positive forms. Certainty is firm believing. “Doubt,” however, is ambiguous in ordinary and even philosophical English. Doubting can signify “disbelieving,” but it can also signify doxic neutrality. “Scepticism” in English is ambiguous in the same way. The neutral mode is often accompanied by valuational neutrality or apathy.

25.—Another question concerns imagination, or better, feigning. Through self-observation, one can confirm that all the components of serious encountering have quasi-, as-if, or pretend versions. One can pretend to remember, pretend to perceive, pretend to value, pretend to will, and so on. Feigning or pretending is often manifested as play and puppies, for example, certainly do play.

26.—As already indicated, “Others” in this essay covers groups as well as individuals. And at least small groups can readily be reflectively observed to pursue shared purposes by shared means, perceiving, expecting, and valuing, together what are the same things for the group members. This can be conspicuous in team sports and for packs of dogs hunting.

27.—It should be made explicit that reflection on Others has a cognitive or epistemic function. While we always already encounter Others in everyday life, reflection on Others comes in addition to this and it not only has the believing component predominating, but also, where experiencing is concerned, can be perceptual and recollective in fictive as well as serious ways. More significantly, perhaps, the perceiving or recollecting of the encouragements and things-as-encountered in the Others are what can justify believing not only in present and past actual cases, i.e., facts, but also in eidē or universal essences. Although not
elaborated methodologically, the cases adduced above were meant to clarify eidetic species and the genus of reflection on Others.
III.

Indirect Encountering Reflectively Analyzed

INTRODUCTION

1.—There is a difference between the direct and the indirect encountering of things. The emphasis in the history of phenomenology, as in the rest of modern philosophy, has been on direct encountering. This is for epistemological reasons. When there is a conflict between what is indirectly encountered and what is directly encountered, the directly encountered is ultimately decisive. But at least in industrialized societies, there is acquaintance with vastly more things through indirect encountering than through direct encountering, and accordingly, for those who live in such societies, indirect encountering needs to be understood and appreciated.

2.—In the following exposition, a clarification of what encountering is in general will first be attempted, some traditional doctrines will be objected to, and then the difference between direct and indirect encountering will be explored. Although there is extensive literature on this theme, this essay is not a work of scholarship, even critical scholarship—which could fill a book—but a modest investigation that invites the reader to verify, correct, and extend it. If there is anything original about it, it concerns terminology, genre, and the secondary emphasis on thetic or positional components of believing, valuing, and willing. The approach will be phenomenological, which can alternatively be characterized as “reflective analysis.”

3.—“Analysis” here signifies not only the distinguishing of components within the thing analyzed but also the result, which can be descriptive in particular as well as in general terms. It will be described in general terms here, with reference to particulars only as examples of general and specific universals. “Reflective” here first of all refers to a theoretical focusing on processes of encountering but immediately goes on to include things-as-encountered, so that what is analyzed has a twofold theme. (Actually, there is a fourfold theme when the participation of the “I” in the operational stratum of encountering is reflected
on, but for present purposes that side of the situation reflected upon can be disregarded). And for present purposes, it will also not be necessary to leave the natural or, better, worldly attitude.

ENCOUNTERING IN GENERAL

4.—The central concept of phenomenology is arguably that which is expressed by Husserl with the word “Erlebnis.” Over the decades, this word has been translated into English in a number of ways. Some colleagues render it as “experience,” while others use “mental process,” and yet others use “lived experience.” “Experience” underemphasizes the components of valuing and willing that are discernible in Erlebnisse, something that will be worked against below. “Mental process” seems for many too psychological. As for “lived experience,” one can wonder about what an un-lived experience might be, i.e., what benefit the qualifier brings. “Lived experience” seems a translation of “expérience vécue,” which the French have used to render Husserl’s Erlebnis, but “lived experience” seems not to connote the subjectivity and process that the rendering of the French expression with “lived through experience” or “living experience” might better convey.

5.—Against the mentioned expressions in English for the concept expressed by Husserl’s Erlebnis, I urge instead the English word “encounter,” or better, “encountering.” This is because the components of valuing and willing but also of believing, in broad significations, can more easily be connoted and can also be used to specify the generic term. Thus some encounterings are “valuational encounterings” in which liking, disliking, or apathy about something predominates, others are “practical or volitional encounterings” in which there is willing for, willing against, or being volitionally neutral toward the continued or inactual existence of something is predominant, and yet others are—to use Husserl’s word—“doxic encounterings” in which there predominates believing in, disbelieving in, or skeptical neutrality about something.

6.—In addition to the inclusion of what might be called in general the thetic or positional components just listed, encounterings can also include experiential components of perceiving, remembering, and expecting of real things, and even the experiencing of ideal things such as concepts and universal essences. It has been traditional in phenomenology to emphasize the stratum of what can in general here
be called “experiencing,” something that fosters and benefits from rendering Erlebnis as “experience,” but—again—the rendering of it as “encountering” can help remind us to include the components of believing, valuing, and willing.

7.—Correlative to the mentioned components within encounterings, things-as-encountered can be reflectively discerned and described with respect to how they are experienced, i.e., as-perceived, as-remembered, and as-expected or as-ideally-intended, as well as with respect to how they are posited, i.e., as-believed-in, as-valued, and as-willed. In the latter respect, things can be willed for their own sakes, which is to say as ends, and they can be willed for the sake of other things, which is to say as means, and then one can distinguish the intrinsic and extrinsic “uses” that things-as-willed can have. In analogous fashion, one can discern the intrinsic and extrinsic values that things-as-valued have, and even intrinsic and extrinsic belief characteristics that things-as-believed-in have, e.g., as effects and causes.

8.—These terms may become clearer when examples are related to them in what follows.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT ENCOUNTERINGS CONTRASTED

9.—As part of the effort to get a permit for some work on my house, I recently obtained a copy of a map and floor plan from the permitting agency of my city. It seems to show what one might see from some position above this property, with the roof of the house and the trees on the land removed. It has lines and gives distances for the fence, the street, and the walls around and between the rooms within the house. The direction of north is also indicated. It is in black and white and many things such as windows, furniture, trees, and grass are not depicted. I have no doubt that it is proportionally accurate about the area and structure.

10.—This map is a kind of “pictorial representation” of my house and the land attached to it. On the basis of seeing it, I can experience my house in a somewhat unusual way. This is a case of indirect experiencing to begin with, and upon reflective analysis, it can be seen to have two strata, one a seeing of the paper with lines on it immediately before me, and on that basis, another experiencing of the layout of my house and land. More properly put, I encounter the depiction, and on the basis of encountering it, I encounter my house, but indirectly rather than directly, as is usual.
11.—What else does reflective analysis disclose in such a case? To begin with, I not only see the sheet of paper with lines, words, and numbers written on it, but I also believe in it as a physical thing on the desk before me and value it positively as an accurate and indeed fascinating representation. It also has practical use for me and my workmen in showing where work is allowed by the city authorities to be done.

12.—But what is represented by this depiction is also itself encountered. The first thing for me was to trace with my eyes the routes through the building from the front door through the parlor to the kitchen and dining room and then to the bedrooms and finally out the back door to the yard. These routes are practical. To some extent they are experienced memorially but they are also experienced in a fictive way that is as much expectational as perceptual and memorial, no doubt because it is a matter of what is deeply familiar. Part of the represented familiar house plan is its comfortableness, which is to say how it is positively valued by me. It is conceivable that somebody not familiar with these things might negatively value some aspect or other, say how the second bathroom is rather close to the parlor.

13.—The infrastratum of this encountering is predominantly visual but also secondarily tactual, as I trace or am conscious of being able to trace with my finger on the depiction how one might move about with in or around this building that I live in. But when not reflectively distinguishing and analyzing this infrastratum, it is the depicted place that is thematic. That it is a depicted place is, one can well say, “overlooked” and there is no explicit consciousness that the encountering is indirect or representational. What is different from usual is, as mentioned, the point of view high above the property and the omission of the roof and trees.

AGAINST TRADITIONAL REPRESENTATIONALISM

14.—There is a traditional account of experiencing that still deserves to be denounced now even over a century after Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. This is the account whereby what one directly experiences even in perceiving and remembering are “ideas,” as John Locke called them, which are “in” one’s mind and are different from the external realities themselves. This account can be opposed by means of reflective analysis, which shows no difference between, to begin with, what one directly experiences and the thing directly experienced. It is
true for perceived physical things that one aspect, such as the front, is always presented while other aspects, including the back and the inside are appresented, but the relation between the presented and the appresented is not the alleged relation between the idea and the reality it allegedly represents, if for no other reason than that the appresented can be made presented by moving around or looking inside the physical thing, while there is never direct access to the external realities in the traditional representationalist account.

15.—The traditional representationalist account may then again stem from how the appearances of physical things change as the distance between them and our sense organs, e.g., our eyes, changes. Then the visual appearances get larger or smaller as we get closer or further from the thing, but we nevertheless perceive the physical thing through them and it does not change its physical size. (Incidentally, phenomenology is not confined to appearances but is about all things—in the signification whereby anything can be a thing—that are or are able to be presented.)

16.—It may be that the traditional representationalist account is most attractive when it comes to understanding memory. I had a dog when I was a boy and can remember clearly a time over 60 years ago when he ran down the street yelping excitedly to greet me on my return from somewhere, probably from school. Some might say that there must be a little picture, even a sort of little movie or video, in my mind as an immediate object in the now when I fondly remember Skipper on that occasion. It may also be that ideas are then conceived like words so that linguistic reference to objects might accomplish the reaching into the past that phenomenologically the intentiveness of an operation of remembering actually does. In any case, the problem with the traditional representationalist account is that upon reflection what I find is the operation of remembering going on in the now of my mental life and, correlativey, its intentional object, the excited dog, way back when, over sixty years ago, and nothing in between, no picture moving or not, no word, no memory image.

17.—Another possible source for the representationalist account of recollection and perception (and one could extend it to expectation easily enough) is that the description of indirect experiencing is generalized to it so that all experiencing and thus encountering is considered indirect or representational. I do have a photo of Skipper in which he is depicted sitting with great dignity on a chair he is not supposed to be on. Upon reflective analysis I can discern the infrastratum
of my encountering that is the seeing of a small, flat, and multi-colored piece of paper, and on that basis, the memorial experiencing of my dog on the sofa long ago. In such a case, I normally just encounter my dog without any explicit consciousness that I do so on the basis of seeing this photograph. The infrastratum and the representiveness of the photo are overlooked. But if perception or recollection are like that, then I can reflectively distinguish and describe two strata in them that I can describe with respect to the encountering of an object through a photograph. But I cannot do that with the remembering of Skipper. Remembering, expecting, and perceiving are not stratified like that.

18.—So much in the way of challenging the traditional representationalist account.

CONTINUING THE REFLECTIVE ANALYSIS

19.—The cases of the architectural drawing of my house and the photograph of my dog belong to the species of indirect encountering that can best be called pictorial encountering. This characterization emphasizes the experiential infrastratum, but I hope that my sketch at least of remembering Skipper with and without the photograph intimates how I loved him and hence he had positive value for me. Beyond that, I can mention his role as a companion, which I later came to understand that my mother considered a protection of me as a child—he was a very protective dog as I now recall—which was something practical and volitional at least for her, while for me he was useful simply for having fun together, and of course he was a psychophysical reality undoubtedly believed in by both of us.

20.—There are two other so-to-speak pure types of indirect experiencing. One occurs through words and the other through indications. I hope that the serious reader of the present, mostly descriptive, remarks does not follow along blindly but tries reflectively to observe whether the things I have been talking about are as I say they are. For example, are believing, valuing, and willing, in broad significations, distinguishable components within encounterings? (Incidentally, I include the qualification “in the broad signification” because such components are discernable not only in operations in which an “I” is actively or passively engaged, but also in habitual and even automatic encounterings, in what Husserl called sekondär and primär Passivität.)
21.—Then again, do believing, valuing, and willing, in broad significations, have positive, negative, and neutral modalities? Can one find then nine clear examples ranging from the positive believing in the chair perceived across the room, through an attempt to prevent getting wet by using an umbrella in the rain, to apathy concerning the outcome of some sports competition? And, moreover, are perceiving, remembering, and expecting distinguishable according to whether their objects are in the now, the past, or the future of the encounterings of them, and do they not share being directly intensive to these objects? Reflecting on this brief exercise, one should be able to discern the hearing of sounds or the seeing of marks, the thinking of the significations they convey, and the things that are what the thus significant expressions refer to. This is then another species of indirect encountering. In it, the perceiving and thinking in which the expression is constituted are normally overlooked and what one then thematizes are the things referred to, but even then they are not thematized as-things-referred-to. Only with some reflective analysis does one recognize what reading or hearing about things involves in the way of stratification. Rather, in hearing or reading about things, one simply encounters the things referred to and overlooks the believing in, liking and/or disliking, and even the becoming inclined to support or oppose their happening, or at least this is how things are for serious texts. Fictional literature is another somewhat different case that can be ignored here. And this second species of indirect encountering can be called “linguistic encountering,” provided that the use of artificial language, e.g., that of mathematical symbols, is also considered language.

22.—There is a third species of indirect encountering, which can be called “indicational encountering.” I had a colleague at a university where I used to teach whose schedule more or less overlapped mine and with whom I enjoyed chatting about various events in university life and the wider world. On the way to my office I habitually came out of the elevator, walked around the corner, and looked to see if there was a light under his door. If there was, it was a rather reliable indication that he was there and I would usually knock on his door and have a gossip.

23.—Now, the light under the colleague’s door is not a verbal expression. Also, it does not resemble what it represents like a photograph does. Nevertheless, upon reflective analysis I can find the same kind of stratification that I find in linguistic and pictorial encountering. There is the perceiving of the light under the
door and on that basis there is the encountering of the colleague in his office. Pictorial and indicational encountering differ from linguistic encountering in not having any significations necessarily involved and they differ from one another in how reflection can disclose resemblances between the depiction and the thing depicted, while my colleague, for example, does not resemble a stripe of light shining under a door.

24.—This analysis has attempted to focus on simple cases, but plainly there are pure and mixed compounds. In a purely linguistic compound, one talks, understands, hears, or writes about a linguistic representation and there is then a linguistic representation of a linguistic representation. A pictorial representation of a pictorial representation is equally possible. As for mixed compounds, there can be a photograph of me peering down the hall at the light under my friend’s door that is described in words and thus a depiction of a case of indicational encountering can be encountered linguistically. To recognize that such complexities need not be static, one need only consider encountering through film and video, where things are indirectly encountered together on the basis of words, pictures, and music indicating moods. And, once again, such encountering always has reflectively discernible components of believing, valuing, and willing within it.

*  *

25.—Let me conclude with reference back to my opening remark. For the Bushmen of the Kalahari, for example, at least before civilization reached them and they were still innocent of written materials, photography, radio, and television, it could have been that indirect encountering occurred only through speech, animal tracks, perhaps some scratchings in the dirt, and of course the appresented mental lives of other human and non-human animals; but for people in industrialized societies the overwhelming bulk of acquaintance with things in the world is through indirect encountering via books and magazines, radio, film, and television, and this is why it is worth attempting a reflective analysis such as this, which can of course be corrected and refined through further reflective analysis. And, I might add, indirect encountering is far more prone to error and deception than direct encountering.
IV.

Utter Unreflectiveness

1.—Jiten Mohanty and I sat together on the plane from New Delhi to New York after the conference on "Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy" in January 1988. At the meeting he had had a conversation with a friend about whether or not one can be conscious of something without any awareness of time and he asked me what I thought. Immediately and without thought, I suggested that one might focus exclusively on an ideal object and while doing so be oblivious of anything temporal. Jiten smiled in his characteristic way and we went on to discuss other matters.

2.—It has been awhile, but I wish to take this opportunity to follow-up on that suggestion, but this time with some thought or, more precisely, phenomenological reflection. I will begin with some clarification of the concept of attitude and then describe how one can be aware of something without being aware of time. I could have drawn on the doctrine of marginal consciousness developed by our shared friend, Aron Gurwitsch, if I had felt need for the support of an authority, but have chosen not to do that.

3.—The following is not an exercise in philology but in phenomenology. That means that my account can be examined by others or even by myself at a later time by reflectively and either seriously or fictively observing cases of mental life of the sorts mentioned and then eideating. When matters are evidenced to be as I describe them, my account will be confirmed, and when my account is mistaken or incomplete, the reader is encouraged to correct or complete it phenomenologically.

4.—Many phenomenologists would say that what one first finds upon reflection are processes or even acts of sensuous perceiving. I suspect, however, that this is a product of the naturalism that plagues philosophy in our time. For those whose outlook has not been naturalized through study of engineering, naturalistic science, and certain types of philosophy, what one first finds upon reflection are attitudes and these are first of all characterized by their positional components. Ask an American male undergraduate about his attitude toward professional football and typically he replies that he likes it. This is not a passing feeling but an abiding attitude and not so much perceptual as valuational.
5.—Further inquiry and reflection readily discloses that such a student has encountered the playing of that game chiefly representationally through watching television and also that it is a social observation of players and thus, in just these two respects, it is already again not an act of sensuous perceiving. But, again, the first thing he probably remarks upon is the positive affective component of liking. Correlatively, he would probably also say, "Professional football is good."

6.—Affective attitudes can be sorted in various ways. For example, they can be sorted according to the temporality of the object. Thus far in the football example, the temporality is vague, that is, it is indeterminate whether games in the now, past, future, or at all such times are referred to. Upon reflection, however, it is clear that football games, when they occur, do occur in time. One can fondly remember this or that past game or, less determinately, just how football was so much more wonderfully played at some earlier time.

7.—Nostalgia, regret, guilt, shame, and pride are easily illustrated retrospective affective attitudes. Attitudes toward the future include hope, fear, and anxiety. And besides prospective as well as retrospective attitudes there are attitudes toward objects now. Ask the student while he is watching a game and he may well reply that he likes what he is seeing.

8.—There are other positional attitudes toward objects in time. Those of the practical or volitional sort can be negative in being directed at efforts to destroy, prevent, diminish, etc. or positive in being directed at efforts to create, preserve, enhance, etc. Interestingly, however, there are no practical attitudes directly intitative to present or past objects, although one can be indirectly positively intitative to them in willing their preservation or restoration.

9.—If one has been exposed to a great deal of naturalistic science and recent philosophy, one probably tends not only to be naturalistic but also intellectualistic in orientation. This signifies that concerns with the affective and conative components of attitudes tend to be disregarded for the sake of thinking, believing, and evidencing. Having paid respect to the affective and conative attitudes above, however, more intellectual attitudes can now be turned to.

10.—On the level of common-sense thinking, of thinking in the cultural as well as the formal and naturalistic disciplines, and even most of philosophy, there are preoccupations with what to call a thing, what to say about it, whether to believe in it or not, and how to justify such believing through evidencing. When
this cognitive attitude prevails, one can still find feeling and striving in the background.

11.—Most generally, there are two sorts of objects. There are the real or, better, the temporal objects. For transcendental phenomenologists, these include conscious life in its non-worldly status as well as houses, automobiles, chewing gum, etc. Then there are ideal objects. Normal adult humans are latently familiar with various sorts of them as well.

12.—Patent familiarity with ideal objects is often produced in introductory logic courses. There one can become adept at recognizing the logical forms that particular judgments and the theories built up from them have. One can also become adept, whether it is accepted or not in the school of the theory of logic one's instructor subscribes to, at recognizing the universal or eidetic forms words or states of affairs exemplify.

13.—Or to consider a little arithmetic, the number names "one, two, three" are expressive of concepts, indeed formal concepts. When what is enumerated is not specified verbally, they can be reexpressed with symbols, and they can be combined such that there is 1+2=3, 3-2=1, etc. Moreover, one can become clearly and distinctly aware of the formal universals of oneness or unity, two-ness or duality, and threeness or triplicity that are instantiated by the formal concepts expressed by "one, two, three" or habitually bestowed upon matters in the process of counting them.

14.—One more distinction between attitudes needs to be mentioned. When the student is asked about professional football, he may reflect. It is not improbable that he merely answer on the basis of habit, or indeed, because of what others have often said or what he has long been expected to say. But he might also turn to his attitude and observe and analyze it, however briefly and superficially, and thus produce, with the justification of a modicum of evidencing, the statement “I like it” or the correlative equivalent statement “It is good.”

15.—Intellectuals, especially in the humanities and some schools of thought in the social sciences, reflect fairly habitually and may not appreciate how a naturalistic scientist usually does not. An astronomer, for example, does not regularly fret over how stars appear to and are posited by him, or are perceived with or without instruments by which he is aware of them. Then there are the belief characteristics constituted in doxic components of his conscious life, the states of
stellar affairs constituted in his thinking, and how some objects may be tacitly
good or bad or at least handsome, plain, or ugly.

16.—Besides such unreflectiveness in some types of science, there is
unreflectiveness in everyday life. While driving, one can of course reflect on how
the road presents itself correlative to one's encountering of it, especially if one is
bored while driving (and influenced by phenomenology!), but that is unusual.
What is usual is to ignore or overlook not only the encountering and its
components but also the object as-it-is-encountered. Then there is simply the road
and other cars in one's focus. What is evidenced when one reflects is an utterly
unreflective attitude.

17.—Can one be aware of something with no sense of time, no awareness of
objects as located in time, as present, past, or future, or as going on in time whether
staying the same or changing? For the present writer, this is difficult to do. He is
too habituated to reflecting. But he does recognize that his tendency to reflect is
unusually strong and also habitual. And he is nevertheless confident that he could
train himself or be trained by others to be utterly unreflective on purpose and, in
addition, to be so in a special attitude that is directed exclusively toward ideal
objects, such as 1+2=3, which are not temporal. This possibility is clear.
V.

Some Reflective Analysis of Recollecting

In recollection my attention goes back to some past experience that has been dropped and I grasp it anew. I recollect not simply the thing I experienced in the past but the whole context—the past-presented and appresented background, and myself as past perceiver.\(^3\)

INTRODUCTION

1.—While searching for something else in the Dorion Cairns Nachlass, I noticed many mentions of recollection. While “memory” occurs fewer times and “remembering” or versions of it, especially “I remember,” occurs many more times, “recollection” or a version of it occurs frequently. Study showed that “recollecting” is the subject of the most significant remarks by Cairns, e.g., “recollecting is recollecting something” (037936), and hence will be used to name the theme of this analysis.

2.—Cairns’s scattered remarks about recollecting are nevertheless usually made in passing and almost always brief. The epigraph above seems the most comprehensive statement. In the exposition below there will be some page citations from the Nachlass but only one other quotation and two references to publications by Cairns. It should be emphasized that what I am expressing here is what I have accepted from him phenomenologically. This is how my teacher related to his teacher, Edmund Husserl, i.e., not by expressing interpretations of texts, but by expressing that which, with the help of his teacher’s writings, he was able himself reflectively to observe, correct, and extend.

3.—A running example will be useful and, first of all, it can help clarify the general conceptual framework. Here I can recollect something that happened when I was about nine years old. It happened perhaps a month after I got a handsome shelter dog about two-years old already named Skipper who quickly accepted that we were his new family and who could be let loose in the neighborhood and

\(^3\) Nachlass of Dorion Cairns, p. 037275. Hereafter cited with six-digit page numbers between parentheses embedded in the body of the text.
expected to come home by supper time, but who tended to remain in front of our house and, as my mother put it, “watch the world go by.”

4.—What I recollect especially vividly was a time then that Skipper saw me walking up the street from school, rushed toward me yipping, whining, and wagging his tail so hard he almost fell over, and finally almost knocked me down in an attempt to lick my face. Of course I had a family that undoubtedly loved me, but this has always been the greatest expression of unconditional love that I can recollect. He and I were pals for a decade until, while I was away in the Marine Corps, he was hit by a car. I have recollected many times how I was greeted that afternoon on the way home from school some 65 years ago.

5.—In his scattered remarks about recollecting my teacher Cairns would take such an example and restrict it to the recollecting of a sensuous perceiving of a physical thing (011120, cf. 011066). That certainly simplifies the case, but I believe it important to make clear at the outset that what we find when we reflect on our mental lives is better called the encountering of cultural things (and in my example, it is a matter of an animate cultural thing, a beloved dog). Although I will sometimes speak of “intensive processes,” Cairns’s ultimately preferred English equivalent for Husserl’s “Erlebnisse,” which I also accept with, it should not be forgotten that “encounterings,” as I prefer, include not just experiencing (of which sensuous perceiving is a most significant species), but also thetic or positional components that can be called, in broad significations, believing, valuing, and willing and can also be said to be doxic, pathetic, and praxic. A great deal is abstracted from if one speaks with Cairns just of sensuous perceiving and physical things.

6.—Physical things, animate or not, are correlative abstracted by Cairns in his analyses from what we encounter as concrete cultural objects. These are objects that as such essentially include uses as ends and/or means, intrinsic and/or extrinsic values, and belief characteristics, all correlative to the pertinent species of positing in the encounterings of them. Accordingly, what is recollected concretely are encounterings that are, technically speaking, intensive to things, and—in the broad significations whereby anything is a thing—things-as-encountered. And if one reflects on the recollecting of something as recollected, one can recognize that it too is an encountering and the thing recollected is a thing-as-recollectively-encountered. Encounterings in what follows will usually be distinguished by type of experiencing founding them, i.e., as perceptual, recollective, or expectational in
broad significations, the perceiving of animate things or so-called “empathy” included, and reflectively observational as well, but the whole encounterings that such types of experiencing specify are always implied in such simplified expressions. My teacher was well aware of all that I try to capture with the concept I express with “encountering” (e.g., 013065), but offers no word for it himself unless it be “intending,” which I have not noticed him to clarify to that effect.

7.—Turning again to the greeting of me by Skipper long ago, certainly he visually perceived me as he came running, but he was also moved by positive valuing to strive to do what he did. I can also recollect the delight I felt with his approach and how he was correlative delightfully for me. Moreover, whenever I recollect what happened that afternoon on a street in San Francisco long ago, I certainly believe in it, but what predominates in my recollecting is my delight, i.e., an intense positive valuing. In short, there is a recollective encountering of the long past encounter with Skipper and hereafter when I speak of recollecting, the respects in which it and what is recollected in it need to be comprehended as implicitly matters of encountering and things-as-encountered. I do not think my teacher would disagree with this but I have not seen him make it clear, as I believe it should be at the outset. (What is recollected cannot be call a “recollect” like what is perceived is called a “percept,” but if need be one could awkwardly speak of a “recollectum” and “recollecta.”)

8.—The significance of this account will be shown in the end to be epistemological, but most of it is a series of verifiable distinctions making up an analysis. But first what I call a Zombie theory needs to be attacked in order to clear the ground. This is the theory of so-called memory images. They are a species of the representationalism by which centuries of modern philosophy and psychology have been contaminated. By this theory, there is an image or representation occurring at the same time as the act of recollecting and standing for the past event. To be sure there is what can be called representational experiencing, e.g., the experiencing I have of my dog when I look at a photo of him and there can be recollecting of cases of representational experiencing, but it is a grave error to believe that all experiencing is representational.

9.—I cannot explain the attraction of this widely held false theory but suspect that the motivation includes accepting that a verbal expression, picture, or other representation is able to refer to things distant in space and/or time but that the mental processes phenomenologists focus on cannot be intentive to such things,
which is a mistake. Perhaps it relies on “thingly thinking” whereby mental processes are mistaken for the somatic processes intimately accompanying them in sensuous perceiving and reference is somehow reduced to causal connections, although, interestingly, recollecting is not embodied like sensuous perceiving is. And perhaps the memory image arises from an alleged compatibility of things as perceived and things as mathematically understood in physics that are granted priority.⁴

10.—The problem with this theory that has been killed and then risen from the dead many times is first of all that of how one can tell that the memory image corresponds to the past event accurately or not if one does not have independent access to that past event. Then again, when I recollect the loving encounter with Skipper 65 years and some 3,000 miles from where I am now writing, there is nothing like a brief film that plays “in my head,” as some say, simultaneously with the operation of recollecting. Phenomenologically, I cannot find any memory images in the now or in my head or anywhere else.

SOME REFLECTIVE ANALYSIS

11.—Phenomenological accounts are not logical explanations with premises and conclusions and phenomenological method is also not argumentative but descriptive. This is to say that a series of distinctions are clarified with which something that one had a common-sense understanding to begin with is extended and, if need be, corrected so that in the end one has a deeper understanding of the thing or things in question.

10.—In the first place, recollecting can be straightforward or reflective. If it is straightforward, one observes that which was previously encountered, e.g., Skipper running down the street at me, to the disregard of the encountering of it and how it is as-encountered. In reflective recollecting, however, one not only includes the earlier encountering in one’s theme but also that which is encountered in as-it-is-encountered, in which case there is much to analyze and describe, e.g., how the visual appearance of the dog grew larger and the auditory appearances of

⁴ Probably the preoccupation of many colleagues with language plays a role in some way as well. Certainly one can recollect operations of expressing and comprehending and also various sorts of syntactical operations involved in them, but exploring such would extend the present analysis excessively and thus the task can be left for another day and/or other investigators.
his joyful sounds grew louder as he approached my embodied self, but also the simple existence and intense value he had for me while I encountered him. Husserlians speak of noetico-noematic analysis in this connection and it is in this respect especially that the present analysis as has been already illustrated initially in the clarification of the concepts of encountering and things-as-encountered above and can be extended in detail. Incidentally, while it may be factually impossible to recollect something that was earlier encountered, it is ideally possible to do so. Always bearing in mind the possibility of reflection, it is often convenient to emphasize straightforward recollecting.

11.—In the second place, recollecting, like all encountering of realities, can be serious or fictive (“fictive intending” is, following Cairns, preferable to “imagination” because there is no verbal allusion to images in it). I do seriously recollect seriously my encounter with Skipper but can also readily feign a neighbor whom I do not recollect across the street witnessing what happened from the side and thus from a different standpoint than mine, in a different perspective, and through different appearances, or, then again, somebody watching from a moving car having a changing appearance. I can also enhance what is seriously recollected fictively, e.g., pretend that Skipper wore a bill that rang as he approached.

12.—In the third place, while things in the past can be said, metaphorically, to fade as they continually get “paster and paster,” things expected from the future may be said to get “sooner and sooner” before they happen. There is a difference in what Husserl calls the “manner of givenness” between things in the past and in the future that can be reflectively discerned. It is possible to go on for awhile observing something right after it stopped happening, i.e., was “impressional,” and began to be past but recollecting is what happens after the previously encountered thing and the encountering of it have been let go or dropped and then are picked up again, which can happen many times, such as I have done over the years with that greeting of me by Skipper. In Husserl’s terms, recollection is thus not primary but secondary memory. As a rule, what is first recollected is clearer and more extensive than it will be later (016486).

13.—In the fourth place, Husserl distinguished between primary and secondary passivity and mental acts that have the ego or I engaged in them. Cairns

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5 As for ideal objects, being atemporal, while they cannot straigtfowardly recollected, the processes intensive to them, evidencing included, are in time and can be recollected repeatedly.
preferred to call passivity "automaticity" and I go further and speak of "operations" rather than acts, which makes a further distinction between active and receptive operations easier to make. In recollection there is always a great deal automatically already there and similarities and contrasts with what is automatically retained can, affect operations of recollecting (037277), as can the original prominence of the event (037280), e.g., the encounter with Skipper, and much can be learned through experimental observation in this connection. It was an active operation of recollecting when I once tried to recollect how and when I acquired and what happened to the many automobiles I have owned since I was 15. There is thus a difference between recollecting that are searching or exploring one’s past and memories that come to mind and sometimes stimulate operations.

14.—In the fifth place, what is recollected is recollected in a cultural setting with spatial, temporal, and causal dimensions, as does the expected and the perceived settings, which are worldly and thus more than nature. One experiences things not only as having presented themselves but also as appresenting much more, including times, places, and causes beyond what one previously encountered and thus cannot recollect as well at touches and sounds of things that were only heard. Other things being equal, there is a similarity between things that are earlier in the past for recollecting and further off spatially for perceiving. Moreover, there is a similarity between locating things in relation to other things and dating things in relation to what is recollected as simultaneous, earlier, and later immediately and mediate and transcendent of as well as immanent in mental life.

15.—In the sixth place, Cairns remarks that the sequence of events can only be recollected in the concrete order in which it originally occurred and thus not backwards, as it were, although separated parts can be recollected out of their original order (037279), e.g., Skipper jumping on me recollected first and then him noticing me and starting to run recollected second. I would add that it is often worth comparing the recollected with the expected and that an expected series of events, e.g., climbing a staircase, can be expected concretely in either order, especially if feigned (but one can also expect blindly but still seriously). A past can, however, be feigned in either direction. Expectation often mirrors recollection, e.g., there is primary and secondary expectation, but not always, e.g., the expected can be run through backwards as well as forward. Moreover, one can recollect expecting, expect recollecting, expect expecting, recollect recollecting, feign recollecting serious perceiving, etc., etc. Indeed, with every operation of
recollecting there is always a horizon of previously actualized and in future actualizable recollecting and other encounterings of the same “recollectum.”

16.—In the sixth place, while primarily automatic processes cannot be engaged and secondarily automatic habitual and traditional processes can be engaged in but do not need to be, operations such as recollecting are active and/or receptive and do have the I engaged in them actively or receptively. The I is transcendent of mental life but on the inward rather than the outward side. She is reflectively recollectable seriously and also fictively. Cairns writes (rendering Erlebnis as “awareness”),

The identity of the ego is not merely an identity in retention, a matter of habitual evidence. In so far as a past awareness is recollected, it is given in present awareness is evidently an awareness in which an ego, now given as “past,” actually or potentially lived when the recollected awareness was impressional. The present recollection is intrinsically an awareness belonging to an ego, the “present” or impressionally given ego. In the present awareness, the impressionally given ego and and the recollectively given, retained ego, are paired to form an evident synthesis of identification. The I who now remembers is the same I who then perceived. This founded, identical, and enduring ego may be reflectively grasped in evidence.6

The whole field of recollection is structured, in Husserlian terms, as ego-cogito-cogitatum.

**EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE**

17.—Dorion Cairns’s definition, which I agree with, has epistemology about critically justified believings in things (theory of value and ethics are parallel disciplines devoted, respectively, to valuing and willings (023095). The question of justification presupposes an understanding of the type of believing involved, in this case, recollecting, and perhaps the above analysis is sufficient to begin with.

Cairns’s scattered brief remarks also often usefully compare and contrast—to give full titles—recollective encountering with perceptual encountering. Thus both include direct experiencing of the things intended to in them, but perceiving is original and recollecting derivative (031518). Moreover, both are “protodoxic,” which is to say, just as perceiving is believing, recollecting is believing. In other words, the awareness of what appears immediately founds and motivates simple positive believing that holds unless modalized into doubting or disbelief.

18.—To go beyond *prima facie* justification, i.e., to show the justification or unjustifiability of something recollected, one can appeal to more and better recollecting and/or in some cases perceiving (011151). There is always striving to make the obscure clearer. Repeated recollecting, even years later, is confirmatory. This is like how what is expected is confirmed or cancelled when the thing expected becomes impressional or is clearly recollected. When believing in a past is cancelled, there is belief in something then being otherwise. The originally presented in perception outweighs the recollected when they conflict, but the recollected seems to outweigh the appresented (010946).

19.—Illusions are possible in recollection just as they are in perception (011336), but things are initially accepted as veridical and only recognized as illusory on the basis of more recollecting and perhaps even perceptual encountering. In the latter respect, Skipper might have been encountered at first as coming to greet me, but in the end ran past me to greet his former owner who approached behind me. As for an illusion in recollection, I have not been able to think of one involving the recollecting of Skipper greeting me, but if one had recollected putting a $100 bill in the monybelt that one continually wore and then found no such bill there when nobody else had access to the belt, the recollection would be denounced as illusory. Absent illusions and other problems, recollecting is critically justified by more and more confirmatory recollecting and even in some cases intersubjectively and then objectively justified.

20.—Serious recollecting justifies believing in previously actual particulars, e.g., Skipper’s behavior that unforgettable time, and fictive recollecting, e.g., of the feigned witnessing neighbor across the street, justifies believing in a possibility, the recollected actuality also justifying the possibility of the past actual thing. Clear and distinct serious and fictive recollectings are then evidencings of the actuality and/or possibility of the things intended to in them and on that basis there can be propositional truths about them.
VI.

Feigning

Throughout the universe of possible mental processes, there is a kind of fictive processes (phantasy-processes, as-if processes) that corresponds to each particular kind of non-fictive processes. Thus: fictive perceivings correspond to perceivings; fictive recollectings, to recollectings; processes of fictive picture-c’ness, to processes of picture c’ness. Likewise: fictive likings correspond to likings; and fictive willings, to willings. (Dorion Cairns, December 15, 1959)

1.—This is not a work of scholarship on texts but is instead based on investigation of some things themselves. Probably the insight it is developed from is somewhere in Husserl, but, as expressed in the epigraph above, I have it from New School lectures by Dorion Cairns. With a reflective analysis, the reader is invited to observe for herself and see whether the things in question are as alleged here. This is not philology but phenomenology.

2.—I will return to defend the thesis in the epigraph above, but first some terminology needs to be established. Most people would say that this investigation is about “imagination,” but I oppose technical use of that expression because, while its seems to contain a dead metaphor and the most important thing about dead metaphors is that they are dead, I am not at all sure that this one is dead. This is because I suspect many believe that the immediate object of this sort of mental or intentive process is always an image and of course images stand for or represent other things. To be sure, one can feign an image, say a photograph of a famous person, and in that case the feigned image is a representation and there is something that is represented by it, i.e., the famous person. But can one not simply feign a person directly, i.e., with no intervening representation involved?

3.—Some thinkers also use the word “picturing” instead of “imagining,” but this is, if anything, more obviously representational. A major motive for these misleading expressions is the representationalism sometimes called “the way of ideas” in modern Western epistemology going back to Locke and Descartes. According to this representationalism, there are always “ideas” between mental or intentive processes and their objects. This doctrine was already refuted by Hume in 1739, but few recognized that, and then, at the beginning of the 20th Century, it was
again refuted by Husserl. It is an impossible position simply because, if one has no
direct access to that represented thing itself, which is precluded by the thesis that
all intuitive processes are representational, there is no standpoint from which to
decide whether and how a representation represents a represented thing. Again,
however, some species of intuitive processes, e.g., those involving photographs,
are representational, but in those cases there is at least in principle the possibility of
direct or presentational access to the represented thing with which the
representation can be compared.

4.—If the expressions “imagination” and “picturing” are misleading, other
expressions can fortunately be more acceptable. “Feigning,” “to feign” in all its
forms, and “fictive(ly)” can be used, but in addition the verb “to pretend to,” the
adjective “pretend,” and the noun “pretending,” and furthermore the qualifier
“quasi-” appear safer and having multiple equivalent expressions allows for some
stylistic variation in an exposition. Thus, I can visually feign a cat standing on my
desk, i.e., pretend that she is there, and go on to pay attention to the fictive color of
this pretend cat, who can be said not to be a reality but a quasi-reality. And while
feigning her, I can change the cat’s color, feign her moving in this way and that,
etc., just “as if” she were really or seriously there.

5.—As for the opposite of the fictive, it can be called “real” in contrast with
the “quasi-real” where the fictive object, the “fiction” or “fictum” is concerned and
perhaps the expression “factual” is also attractive, but that expression ought to be
reserved to contrast with “eidetic” in phenomenology. Often it suffices to use
“non-” as a qualifier, as happens in the epigraph above, but “serious” appears to
work well in most contexts.

6.—In traditional faculty psychology and in ordinary English, the
imagination is considered one mental capacity or faculty among others and indeed
one that is on a par with the senses, memory, judgment, the emotions, the will, etc.
The thesis here and in the passage above from a lecture by my teacher Cairns is,
however, that this is a mistake and that there is instead a fictive version

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7 Sometimes both “feigning” and “pretending” include an intention to deceive, e.g., if one
pretends to like a boss whom one despises, but here the signification with this intention is
excluded. “Feigning” in this non-deceptive signification occurs in adjectival form in Dorion
Cairns, “Perceiving, Remembering, Image-Awareness, Feigning Awareness,” in F. Kersten and
R. Zaner, ed., *Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism: Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns*
corresponding to every type of serious intending. Thus, e.g., I can pretend that Marilyn Monroe was my date for my High School prom, which is to say that I fictively recollect something I cannot really or, better, seriously recollect.

7.—To support this thesis, I will describe a number of examples of kinds of feigning and objects-as-feigned and invite the hearer or reader of this exposition to attempt to verify my descriptions. Methodologically, I thus ask for reflective analyses and, beyond that, for my hearer or reader to rely on what is technically called “phenomenological-psychological epochê, reduction, and purification.” Simply put, one may well, for example, believe in photons, sound waves, neurological processes, etc., and ways in which they affect at least sensuous perception, but to focus most effectively on the various types of feigning or pretending and their fictive or quasi-real correlates, it is best provisionally to abstract from such factors.

8.—THE SENSES. Accepting for present purposes that there are five senses and, because humans are “visual animals,” we shall begin with SIGHT, but focus on the intentive process, i.e., seeing, rather than the capacity. Many people seem to consider all pretending a matter of visual feigning, which is quite mistaken. Can one visually feign a cat standing on a book across the desk at which one is sitting? Many would call what one feigns is such a case a “visual image,” but we already know better than that since what is feigned does not represent something else, so I will instead call it a fictive, pretend, or quasi-real thing, and—again—recognize that it does not stand for something else. It is interesting, perhaps, that if the cat is feigned to stand still and one pretends to lean forward toward her and then back, she does not change her own feigned size but the appearance of her, as feigned, gets larger and then smaller. Can one thus not only feign objects, but also their visual appearances?

9.—HEARING. Suppose next that one feigns a fictive cat who is purring. Now we can focus on “auditory feigning,” perhaps with our eyes shut, and again pretend to lean forward and back. Can one then not find fictive auditory appearances that get louder and quieter while the purring itself does not? Perhaps matters are similar for the feigned smell of the cat. As for taste and touch, contact is required and I find it as difficult to say how a cat tastes as to say how she smells. But I can readily feign the fictive TOUCH if I pretend tactually to stroke the cat’s furry back. Fictive sounds and fictive touches are clearly different from fictive sights and thus it is clear that not all feigning is visual.
10.—RECOLLECTING. If one were to call seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching types of perceiving, it may be easier to recognize that fictive recollecting of not only past fictive percepts but also feigned past perceivings, such as my feigned seeing of my feigned date to the prom, who was already mentioned. I can pretend today to recollect my delight at my fictive date.

11.—EXPECTING. Probably more frequent for most than fictive recollection is the feigning of future processes and what is fictively intended to in them. Can one not expectationally feign the taste of something in one’s next meal, perhaps while deciding on it in the restaurant, and, in addition the feigned future tasting? Are there then not fictive versions of serious types of recollecting and expecting as well as perceiving, which can furthermore be specified with respect to for the mentioned five senses?

12.—REFLECTING. Then again, what seems best called reflecting or, better, “serious reflective perceiving of intentive processes” is not sensuous and it has already been indicated in the cases of past and future serious or fictive perceiving. In other words, there is non-sensuous perceiving. Perhaps enough has been expressed to invite reflective observation and analysis of multiple types of feigning corresponding to serious intentive processes involved with the senses and with reflection on them. Is it not also possible to fictively perceive intentive processes?

13.—Mental life includes much more than perceiving. If non-representational or, better, “presentational intentive processes,” e.g., perceiving, recollecting, and expecting, have had enough asked about above to encourage the hearer or reader to look for herself and thus seek insight into how the things in question are, then “representational experiencing” can be considered next. It can involve indications, pictures, or texts. There does not seem to be a traditional title in traditional faculty psychology for the capacity or capacities involved here. The intentive processes involved in these three types have two strata.

14.—INDICATIONAL EXPERIENCING. On the basis of seeing a frown on somebody’s face, one can apperceive in the Other the intentive process of disapproval of something. Because there is no resemblance between a seen facial configuration and an intentive process, the experience is “indicalational,” i.e., the frown indicates the intentive process of disapproval. For the general purpose of the present analysis, it can now simply be asked whether or not one can feign a frown and with it what it indicates in an Other.
15.—PICTORIAL EXPERIENCING. If there is, however, resemblance between the representation and the thing represented, “pictorial representational experiencing” might be spoken of. Lest this expression be taken to refer only to strictly visual cases, there is the example of hearing somebody singing in an audio recording or over the radio and apprecitatively experiencing the feeling behind the Other’s voice. And just as that can occur for serious cases, can one not easily feign a sound that is “depictive of” an Other’s emotion?

16.—LINGUISTIC EXPERIENCING. And then again, we experience “linguistic expressions” from Others. Sometimes we experience the Other’s thinking on the basis of seriously hearing sounds, seeing marks or signing, and, with Braille, touching raised dots. Representations of these types can be serious, but can we not also feign them? Especially for linguistic expressions, how they indicate thinking and the production of sounds, marks, signing, and Braille dots are one thing and what the expressions refer to, e.g., name, are another thing.

17.—If enough has now been expressed preliminarily about fictive and serious representational as well as presentational experiencing, there are still fictive and serious types of what phenomenologists call “positionality” to be analyzed.

18.—BELIEVING. Often if not usually, “judgment” in traditional faculty psychology is chiefly a matter of believing. One can believe propositions and witnesses, but the focus here will be on “believing in” objects. Usually, it seems, one believes seriously as well as positively, but one can also disbelieve seriously in how, e.g., the moon is made of cheese, and one can fictively disbelieve in the chair on which one is sitting. To recognize such fictive and serious forms of believing, one needs to reflect on such types of believing. And that requires distinguishing the component of believing from presentational and representational experiencing, on the one hand, and from other forms of positing, on the other. Where the general thesis of this investigation is concerned, the imagination is again not a capacity on a par with judgment or belief, but there is fictive believing parallel to serious believing just as there is fictive presenting and representing parallel to species of serious experiencing.

19.—EMOTION. In lectures Cairns used the example of the girl next door. Can one pretend to love her even if one seriously does not? This would be positive emotion of a fictive sort. Uncomfortable as it might be, can one not also pretend to hate, e.g., one’s mother? And besides such positive and negative emotional processes, can one not be apathetic toward political candidates, for example?
20.—VOLITION. That there are positive, negative, and neutral fictive as well as serious forms not only of emotion and belief but also of willing. Thus one can seriously strive to wash the dishes and strive to burn the trash, the one a positive willing of clean dishes and the other a negative willing of destroyed trash. And if those can be cases of serious willing, can one not then feign fictive versions of them, perhaps, in contrast, pretending to smash the dirty dishes and wash the trash! Then again, there is the movement of the planets around the sun, another example I recall from Cairns’s lectures. Here one can be volitionally neutral and neither strive to help nor to hinder the planetary movements.

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21.—This analysis can be taken further, perhaps beginning with fictive ends and means in relation to willing and fictive intrinsic and extrinsic values in relation to valuing, but perhaps enough has been offered to show that the so-called imagination is not a capacity on a par with the senses, belief, emotion, and will, but rather denotes fictive versions parallel to perceiving, believing, feeling, and willing. But to agree with this, one needs to look for oneself and observe reflectively.
VII.

The Derivation of Oughts and Shalls from Ises

1.—The impossibility of logically deriving “oughts,” i.e., norms or, better, evaluational propositions, from “ises,” i.e., theoretical or, better, cognitional propositions, is now widely accepted. That a great deal of effort has been devoted to this question of derivation nevertheless suggests that something has been dimly glimpsed. Perhaps the derivability is other than directly logical.

2.—How Edmund Husserl distinguished propositions of these sorts seems not widely appreciated. In the following essay, his account of norms or evaluational propositions will first be supplemented with an account of what can be called “shalls,” i.e., imperatives or, better, volitional propositions, and then the derivation of the justification of evaluational and then volitional propositions from the cognitional in prepredicative conscious life will be explored in a reflective-analytic manner.

3.—A running example will be useful. Years ago the present writer was persuaded by an article that climbing a flight or two of stairs whenever possible fosters a healthier heart. Later, it also occurred to him that doing so was often an alternative to taking the elevator, which, especially if done by many, saves electricity and decreases the need for repair and replacement of elevators, i.e., conserves resources. Persuaded by such environmental as well as health benefits, he successfully sought to institute the habit of taking the stairs whenever feasible. How might it be shown that this preference and choice and the eidos they exemplify are right?

4.—Husserl’s account in Chapter 2 of the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic” in the Logical Investigations (1900) urges that what are here called evaluational propositions, e.g.,

One ought to take the stairs,

are equivalent to a cognitional propositions, e.g.,
A person who takes the stairs is good.

5.—Even though traditionally called value judgments, the latter is as cognitional a proposition as, e.g.,

Thomas takes the stairs.

6.—In the latter case, the whole, “Thomas,” is grasped with the subject term and a part, e.g., an activity in a situation, is grasped with the predicate term and predicated of the subject. What is distinctive of a value judgment is that a value is predicated, i.e., affirmed or denied.

7.—Going beyond the letter but not the spirit of Husserl in the “Prolegomena,” what are best called “volitional propositions” because of the similarity with “cognitional” and “evaluational propositions,” e.g.,

You shall take the stairs,

can be analyzed analogously. Linguistically, “ought” is often used in ordinary English not merely to express advice but often indirectly and politely to express an imperative, but for clarity’s sake expressions indicative of willing rather than evaluation in the speaker can be formed strictly by using “shall.” It is not uncommon to hear reference to the background evaluation when action and thus volition is under discussion. One does not strictly pursue the good but the right purpose that is made right by its being good.

8.—The volitional equivalent of

Thomas shall take the stairs

is, perhaps awkwardly,

Thomas taking the stairs is useful.

9.—This formulation may be thought awkward because the reader is immediately lead to ask “Useful for what and/or for whom?” Perhaps “good” is not as leading, so to speak, as “useful” because it is more familiar or readily refers to a
matter with a positional characteristic, i.e., intrinsic value, but actually it refers to matters of extrinsic value. We need to recognize intrinsic and extrinsic uses as well as intrinsic and extrinsic values, even if the usage is unfamiliar and thus awkward.

10.—Ises or cognitional propositions, i.e., propositions of the form “S is p,” can be tested. Thus, if and only if the state of affairs is as alleged, e.g., Thomas taking the stairs is for health and conservation of the planet, then the allegation is true. Perhaps this consideration also makes the expression “cognitional proposition” more attractive. While their equivalents are solely cognitional, the evaluational norms and volitional imperatives are not, for norms can affect the course of events if accepted or declined, as can imperatives if obeyed or not.

11.—It appears possible to construct a square of opposition for shalls just as Husserl has constructed one for oughts, but a solution to the problem of derivation requires searching below the logical and linguistic levels and as a departure point for that propositions of the universal and particular positive forms are sufficient.

12.—It is not clear to the present writer that conscious life always includes predicating or even thinking, although it does always include believing, valuing, and willing. Thus it may become thematic for us that our friend Thomas routinely takes the stairs rather than the elevator. (One can begin reflecting with a case in another’s life as well as in one’s own.) It is difficult to doubt that an experienced person entering a situation, perhaps an office building, believes that both the staircase and the elevator are conducive to higher floors. Setting aside cases where the floor conduced to is relatively high, e.g., three or more stories above, what is involved in taking the stairs?

13.—Reflectively considered, the staircase vs. elevator encounter is a matter that can be seriously or fictively reflected upon noematically, i.e., the encountered-alternative-as-encountered, and noetically there is the encountering of the staircase/elevator alternative as intentive. Although it will be returned to below, it is not relevant at this point whether the encountering is an Akt or, better, an operation in which an I is engaged, or secondarily passive or, better, habitual. Four correlative noetic and noematic strata can in any case be abstractly distinguished in the encounter reflectively observed and asked about: awareness, belief, evaluation, and volition.

13.—The awareness or, better, experiencing in which the elevator/staircase alternative is encountered is sensuous perception. Little of the phenomenology of sensuous perceiving and objects as perceived needs to be rehearsed here. Believing
and the objects as believed in are somewhat more interesting. Absent sufficient motivation to the contrary, what is sensuously perceived is believed in with positive certainty. In most cases, elevators and stairs are perceived by experienced persons as leading from the first or ground floor to non-appearing parts of the perceptual object, i.e., other floors of the building, just as the building approached from the front is perceived as having non-appearing other sides. At the same time, the elevator and staircase are believed to be conducive, i.e., to be ways to, other floors and thereby halls and rooms within the building.

14.—Strictly speaking, expressions such as “elevator,” “stairs,” “staircase,” “buildings,” “floors,” “halls,” and “rooms” ought not to be used to describe that which is encountered as encountered in the abstract stratum of sensuous perceiving, because those are the names of functional, use, or, best, cultural objects, which, again strictly speaking, indicate the willing stratum and that stratum is part of what is abstracted from thus far in the present analysis, but, this said, confusion should be avoidable. Were precision and detail required, colors, shapes, smells, sounds, textures, etc. could be described for the objects as purely sensuously perceived.

15.—Especially interesting here is how a person can also believe that climbing stairs rather than taking the elevator can have environmental and cardiac effects, perhaps through confidence in expert advice from engineers and medical doctors. Besides going beyond the spatial and temporal to include the causal determinations of the complex sensuous object that is the building in which the person encounters the alternative of elevator/staircase as ways to the floor, hall, and room one is going to, there are the effects on the organism of the person in whom the encountering occurs. Furthermore, it would seem necessary that there be a basis beyond sensuous perceiving for believing that the elevator would require less energy and last longer if fewer people took it over the years to get up one or two stories in the building and that the same would hold for hearts under the same circumstances. This too will be returned to below. For now it may be noted that one can believe in more than what one perceives.

16.—Turning to evaluation, i.e., the valuing and value components abstractly observable reflectively in the noesis and correlative noema of encountering the elevator/staircase alternative, the staircase is the way from the first to the second or third floor that is preferred; differently put,
The stairs are better than the elevator.

17.—While the prompted question “For whom?” may be awkward for the unreflective attitude that was tacitly assumed above, it is useful here and can be answered, reflectively, on the basis of the beliefs mentioned: “For Earth and for Thomas.” At least he prefers the stairs to the elevator and does so because he values a healthier planet and heart. Better put, a healthier heart and planet have positive intrinsic values and taking the stairs for a flight or two whenever possible has higher positive extrinsic value in relation to them for him than taking the elevator.

18.—The situation in the abstractly observable volitional stratum is analogous. The word “use” can be used analogously to “value” and, in that case, means are objects with extrinsic use in relation to purposes, ends, or objects with intrinsic use. Differently put, some items, such as healthier hearts and planets, are willed for their own sakes and the use of other items, such as elevators and staircases are willed for the sakes of items of the first sort, i.e., the ends or purposes, items with correlative intrinsic use. The structural similarity of willing and the willed-as-willed and valuing and the valued-as-valued seems often to lead to their confusion, but they can be kept distinct with careful reflection and terminology. (The interesting question of whether there are intrinsic and extrinsic belief characteristics in objects as encountered, i.e., objects believed in for their own sakes and objects believed in for the sakes of objects believed in for their own sakes, e.g., effects and causes or vice versa, need not to be pursued here.)

19.—Extrinsic uses can be immediate or mediate and also multiple. Thus taking the stairs (or the elevator) is, for the person entering the building, the immediate means to a floor of the building, the hallway is a mediate means, and the room traveled to is another mediate means when the end is a visit with a person located there, but the health of the visitor and the planet are also ends. The question of the ultimate human end does not need to be pursued here. The staircase can also be characterized as a means to the hallway, which is then the immediate end, but then it is often necessary to distinguish relative and ultimate ends and to ask about the scope of the action, i.e., is the person taking the stairs to get to the hallway or to the room or to the meeting with somebody? Analogous distinctions can be made for valuing and intrinsic and extrinsic values rather than willing and the end and means uses constituted in it.
20.—By certain changes of attitude that do not need to be investigated here, non-predicative life can give rise to propositions. These can be cognitional of the original sort that start from believing in the object and its naturalistic determinations, such as shape or animate activity, or they can be evaluational, e.g.,

Thomas ought to take the stairs,

or volitional, e.g.,

Thomas shall take the stairs.

21.—These indicate the encounterings and attitudes in which believing, valuing, and willing predominate. Shalls in particular are aimed at the creation, destruction, fostering, impeding, preserving, protecting, or at least somehow changing of matters, human lives included.

22.—Shalls as well as oughts can be addressed by Thomas to himself as well as by others to him, pronouns “one” included, can be substituted for the subject noun, etc.) As shown, the evaluational and volitional propositions have their cognitional equivalents, which can be tested, but this ought not to distract one from how such propositions have original forms, which arise from the pre-predicative encounterings of objects in which valuing and willings predominate and which are, again, not aimed at knowledge, but at influencing the course of events and obedience respectively.

23.—When a concrete encountering of an object is noetico-noematically analyzed into abstract components of experiencing, belief, valuing, and volition, psychologists, sociologists, historians, and other cultural scientists will be inclined to seek explanations in terms of causes and purposes, but philosophers will be inclined to pursue questions of justification. Thus the believing in the building with its rooms, hallways, staircases, elevators, etc., can be justified in terms of earlier along with current perceiving of the same and similar buildings. Similarly, the willing of an alternative can be justified by the valuing it can be evidenced reflectively as founded upon and motivated by, e.g., the willing of health over illness is justified by the valuing of health over illness.

24.—Most philosophers will probably resist, however, the suggestion that believing might justify valuing, perhaps because values and value systems seem so
much more diverse than beliefs and belief systems, something that emphasis on science and the ignorance of the vast diversity of religious and common-sense belief systems might foster. This is not the occasion to justify this claim about justification; it will be sufficient to proceed hypothetically. Nevertheless, if it was shown strictly scientifically that taking the stairs rather than the elevator actually has *adverse effects* on one’s heart, then most people who learned this would begin taking the elevator more often, some perhaps even contending that this new willing was justified by the valuing justified by the new and better justified believing.

25.—If believing that taking the stairs instead of the elevator is conducive to cardiac and environmental health justifies the valuing of those effects intrinsically and thus the staircase preference extrinsically and if justified valuing justifies willing, then one might speak of the derivation of the justification of willing from valuing immediately, from believing mediately, and from pertinent types of awareness, i.e., evidencing, ultimately. And if volitional and evaluational propositions arise from encounterings of objects in which willings and valuings predominate just as cognitional propositions arise from encounters in which beliefs predominate, then one might speak of a derivation of shalls and oughts from ises through reflection on non-predicative mental life. Perhaps it was a vague sense of this possibility that motivated the attempt merely logically to derive evaluational and volitional from cognitional propositions among philosophical tendencies in which philosophy is chiefly applied logic.

26.—It may be added that truth is not justification, that the word “health” has value connotations that can nevertheless be abstracted from, and that choice as volitional can be distinguished from preference as evaluational. It deserves repetition that persons in authority often use “ought” when they are nevertheless issuing imperatives and thus mean “shall.” And, while one can as an I engage in performing what are then best called “operations,” far more of mental life is habitual in individuals and traditional in groups, and thus there can be efforts to alter what Husserl calls “secondary passivity” so that it is better justified i.e., that culture is more justified or rational. Finally, it may be added that one can speak of taking the stairs as both good and useful and also as *rightly* good and/or useful in order to convey that there is justification behind such claims, or “ought” often connotes this also.

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*  *
27. — In sum, while oughts and shalls cannot be derived from ises logically, such propositions can indicate justified valuings and willings derived from justified believings phenomenologically.
VIII.

The Justification of Norms Reflectively Analyzed

INTRODUCTION

1. In his “Prolegomena zur reinen Logik” (Logische Untersuchungen [1900]), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) offers a quite memorable analysis and example of what a norm is (for those unfamiliar with it, an English translation of the most relevant passage is in Appendix I of this essay): “A warrior ought to be courageous” is equivalent to “A courageous warrior is good.” Plainly, this transforms a norm into a value judgment. Husserl merely expresses this equivalence in a straightforward attitude, i.e., he does not analyze and describe how norms are constituted and justified. I have not noticed such a reflective analysis related to this account in the other publications of Husserl’s lifetime and if such an analysis occurs in work edited from his Nachlass, I am also unfamiliar with it. The present account is, in any case, not an interpretation of Husserl’s texts but a brief attempt at some constitutive phenomenology after the manner of the mature Husserl, i.e., a reflective analysis.

2. In the first section below I attempt to develop Husserl’s example in a vivid way, in the second section I take a purely possible referent of his propositions as a clue to the components of the encountering in which such a case is constituted, and in the third section I consider briefly how norms can be justified.

CONDUCT IN A FIREFIGHT

3. It is unlikely that the hearer or reader of the present analysis has been in combat, but it is likely that she has seen news footage or fictional film depictions of situations like the following and can easily feign it as a possibility. In a firefight there are two groups of warriors within range of each other, firing rifles, and taking cover behind such things as rocks and trees. Members of each group are seeking to kill members of the other group and their motivation is at least that of “kill or be killed.” In order to aim and shoot the rifles effectively, a warrior must expose part
of her head and thus risk being shot herself. To do so is courageous. To keep one’s head down and either not shoot or to shoot without aiming one’s rifle is cowardly. Seeming cowardice can be understood and excused for warriors in their first firefight or suffering from some type of mental or physical wounds. But what is courageous and cowardly for healthy and experienced warriors is clear.

4.—To refer to such an example is to focus on things beneath the stratum of mental life in which propositions are formed and connected, but the pertinent types of the things referred to are cointended, types being unclarified universal essences or eidē, so such an example has an implicit general bearing. Through free-phantasy variation, the eidē vaguely given beforehand can be further clarified, but they already seem clear enough for present purposes. And on the basis of encountering such an instance of warrior courage (or cowardice) one can think and express the propositions “A warrior ought to be courageous” and “A courageous warrior is good” and posit their equivalence. (“A warrior ought not to be cowardly” and “A cowardly warrior is bad” can also be formulated, but hereafter the positive evaluation will be given priority in this exposition.)

5.—To be able to assert that “A courageous warrior is good,” one needs first of all to be able to recognize a warrior and the sort of conduct deemed courageous. Taking cover, shooting, and being shot at is warrior conduct and exposing oneself to enemy fire in order to shoot well-aimed shots is courageous warrior conduct. Courage can be affirmed of a warrior and then the subject matter called “courageous warrior” can have objectivated positive value or “goodness” predicated of it. This is not difficult to see and the equivalence of a proposition of that structure and the proposition, “A warrior ought to be courageous” as referring to the same matter and equivalent to, but not identical with, the first proposition also seems not difficult to see, which might be why Husserl did not pursue the matter further.

6.—One can of course abstract from content and produce the combination of propositional forms, “An S ought to be, do, or have p” is equivalent to “An S that is, does, or has p is good.” The first proposition in this combination is the form of a norm, often in at least much Anglophone philosophy also called an “ought,” which is to say a recommendation made to an Other and/or oneself and not an imperative, command, or “shall,” such as “Thou shalt be courageous!,” although these are sometimes confused in ordinary parlance, where what are actually commands are expressed “politely” as recommendations.
THE CONSTITUTION OF A NORM

7.—What has been said thus far has been done so in the straightforward or unreflective attitude, i.e., things ideal as well as real and fictive if not serious have just been described without reference to how they are intended to, including in syntheses. What one finds if one reflects are, generally speaking, what Husserl calls *Erlebnisse* (and, in addition and perhaps more subtly, things-as-intended-to). Husserl’s expression, *Erlebnis*, has been translated into English in several ways, e.g., as “experience” and “mental process” and even as “lived experience,” which seems an awkwardly mechanical rendering of “*expérience veçue,*” but I prefer to use “intentive process” and “encountering” alternatively, both of these expressions seeming to me more able to cover modes of believing, valuing, and willing as well as thinking and experiencing.

8.—Following ultimately Samuel Alexander, I emphasize the difference between “-ing” words and “-ed” words. Upon reflection not only can a phenomenologist observe seriously or fictively and then analyze and describe encounterings but also things including warriors in firefights as-encountered. In other words, one can practice what Husserl calls noetico-noematic analysis. Where the noematic is concerned, such things as manners of givenness, values, and uses can be discerned, but I will focus on the noetic here, although nowise exclusively.

9.—To analyze the constituting of a thing, one takes the purely possible thing encountered (or intended) as a clue to how it is constituted and then reflects on serious or fictive encounterings of it. To take the propositions offered by Husserl as clues would lead to reflective analysis of the correlative thinking and judging. Better is to take as a clue a case that the propositions could refer to, e.g., a warrior in a firefight. Then there is at least a reflectively feigned case of encountering a warrior who is courageous (or cowardly). This encountering can be directly experienced by her fellow warriors in the firefight who see her conduct there or it can be indirectly encountered by members of an awards committee (or a court martial) who depend on testimony by the fellow squad members and other data, which nowadays might include satellite videos.

10.—I find a somewhat simplified taxonomy of intentive process components sufficient for an analysis like this. In this taxonomy there are two
genera of components. On the level of experiencing, there is the indirect experiencing by the awards (or court martial) committee and that is what makes their encountering indirect. The encountering by the fellow squad members in the firefight is relatively direct and indeed outwardly perceptual although only appresentively so. (I hesitate to call this experiencing “empathy” because I have noticed too many Anglophone Husserlians affected by this word such that they seem to consider this “other-experiencing,” as I prefer to call it, a predominantly valuational rather than experiential process.) The warrior also encounters herself through self-experiencing and indeed presentively so.

11.—The second kind of component discernible in an Erlebnis is thetic or positional and, the problem of wishings aside, there are three species, which are best called believing, valuing, and willing. (How such positings as well as experiencings can be primarily and secondarily passive as well as Akte, is also disregarded for present purposes.) There seems no difficulties where believing is concerned. If the fellow squad member is seen to be using her rifle in one way, she is courageous (and in another way, she is cowardly). The seeing here justifies prima facie the believing in it and is Evidenz, which I prefer to render as “evidencing” since too often “evidence” signifies things other than intentive processes in ordinary and legal English. Husserl says somewhere that “Evidenz ist Erlebnis” which signifies that, e.g., it is not the knife with the accused person’s fingerprints and the victim’s blood on it that is Evidenz for Husserl, but the seeing of them by the laboratory technician who is testifying in court.

12.—There is also a component of willing in the case under analysis. The warrior can will herself to act courageously and her squad leader can command her to do so. But for the constitution of norms, what is crucial is the valuing involved. Prepredicatively, the warrior can approve of her own courageous conduct (or disapprove her cowardice) and her fellow squad leaders and also the committee that might award her a medal (or court-martial her) can also value (or disvalue) her conduct. Valuing is central to whether she can have goodness (or badness) predicated of her courageous (or cowardly) conduct. In other words, the value of the conduct is constituted in valuing and this predominates in the encountering of her conduct.

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8 See Appendix II.
THE QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION

13.—If what has now been said suffices to show how courage (and cowardice) is prepredicatively encountered, the level of Husserl’s propositions can next be attained through the categorial forming of the subject and the objectivating and predicating of goodness and badness. But this only accounts for how it is that one can say that some warrior conduct is good (or bad) and indeed may be recommended to be (or not to be) engaged in. This analysis has not yet addressed the question of justification, i.e., of whether courage is right or rational and cowardice not.

14.—As I understand Husserl, a positing is justified when it is founded upon and motivated by evidencing. Whether it is a matter of direct self-experiencing or of direct or indirect other-experiencing, there is experiencing that can play the role of evidencing in the case analyzed. People are always motivated by past encounterings to behave and to evaluate themselves and others in various ways. This is where critical examination needs to consider not only the motivation but also the foundedness of the valuing component on the evidencing and correlative the reflectively discernable value and givenness of the thing valued. If one is a dedicated pacifist, one does not try to kill others even if they are trying to kill you. The valuing of oneself staying alive for others may be a strong motive and only loosely related on the part of the warrior to the evidencing of the need to shoot most effectively at the enemy.

15.—At least as important in this connection is how the fellow squad members and the awards committee (or court martial) has its valuing not only motivated by the evidencing of the warrior’s conduct but also tightly founded on that evidencing. More colloquially speaking, these others can base their valuing on “really seeing” seriously or fictively what the conduct was in the situation. (There is a second norm here concerning how those who judge are obliged to proceed, it seems analyzable in similar fashion, and will not be pursued here.) And on the basis of such justified valuing the judgers can go on to form and express propositions of two sorts and also the equivalence between them, as Husserl did in the “Prolegomena.” In other words, it is right that warriors ought to be courageous rather than cowardly. And with an ought then justified, a constitutive phenomenologist can go on to investigate a “shall,” i.e., an imperative or
command, but this is beyond the scope of this brief reflection, which has only sought to show how oughts are constituted and justified.

16. — In sum, the present analysis has accepted from Husserl that an ought or norm implies a value judgment and goes on to take a purely possible referent of such a judgment as a clue to the components of encountering in which that referent is constituted prepredicatively, especially including evidencing and valuing, and finally examines how evidencing can justify the valuing in which the attributed value is constituted.

APPENDIX I

"‘A soldier should be brave’ rather means that only a brave soldier is a ‘good’ soldier, which implies (since the predicates ‘good’ and ‘bad’ divide up the extension of the concept ‘soldier’) that a soldier who is not brave is a ‘bad’ soldier. Since this value-judgement holds, everyone is entitled to demand of a soldier that he should be brave, the same ground ensures that it is desirable, praiseworthy etc., that he should be brave. The same holds in other instances. ‘A man should practice neighborly love,’ i.e., one who omits this is no longer a ‘good’ man, and therefore eo ipso is (in this respect) a ‘bad’ man. ‘A drama should not break up into episodes’—otherwise it is not a ‘good’ drama, not a ‘true’ work of art. In all these cases we make our positive evaluation, the attribution of a positive value-predicate, depend on a condition to be fulfilled, whose non-fulfillment entails the corresponding negative predicate. We may in general, take as identical or at least as equivalent the forms ‘An A should be B’ and ‘An A that is not B is a bad A,’ or ‘Only an A which is a B is a good A.’” (Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), Vol. I, p. 82.
APPENDIX II

Taxonomy of 17 (?) Intensive Process Components

- Encountering
  - “Experiencing”
    - Indirect
    - Direct
  - Positing
    - Wishful(?)
    - Volitional
    - Valuational
    - “doxic”
  - “thinking”
    - “linguistic”
      - depicting
      - indicating
    - perceiving
    - remembering
    - expecting

- Direct
  - disbelieving
  - valuing
  - believing
  - neutrality
  - willing
  - disvaluing
  - “apathy”
  - valuing
  - disvaluing
  - neutrality
  - willing
  - disbelieving
  - valuing
  - believing
  - neutrality
IX.

Reflective Analysis of One Way to Compose Reflective Analyses

1.—The story behind the present analysis and related texts is quickly told. Like some others, I have become concerned that very few colleagues in our phenomenological tradition today actually engage in phenomenological investigations rather than scholarship on texts. In other words, most phenomenologists now chiefly speak and write about what others have previously written in our tradition and do so by methods no different than those used in studies of Aristotle or Kant. One can wonder if these “phenomenologists” are phenomenologists at all.

2.—In response, I have published a small book written in the simplest terms I could manage about the basic approach in general of phenomenology as I have come to understand it, an approach that seems best to call “reflective analysis.” In it, this approach is taken to itself. My book is entitled *Reflective Analysis* and is chiefly addressed to advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students in philosophy, although I hope that others of higher sophistication and in disciplines beyond philosophy will also read it.

3.—When I had an opportunity to teach my text, I found that the questions at the ends of the chapters and the diagrams were helpful and that students appreciated the simple terminology, but nevertheless craved more concrete investigations that they might imitate when they tried to produce reflective analyses of their own, which it is my greatest hope that they would learn to do. This teaching experience led me to assemble some reflective analyses that I have written over the years into a collection that might also be used in teaching.

4.—It can be said that I am advocating a genre for phenomenological writing. Such writing above all largely avoids reference to figures, texts, quotations, footnotes, and other such apparatus relevant for scholarship and instead chiefly evokes only the authority of the things themselves. The author of a
reflective analysis calls on the reader to confirm, correct, and/or extend the analysis through her own reflecting on things of the same sort.

5.—Furthermore, a reflective analysis is written in the simplest technical terminology possible and it is concise, usually about 3,000 words long. A text of that length can not only be studied by students prior to discussion in class but can be read to professional colleagues at conferences in about thirty minutes, which then allows time for discussion and a brief intermission before the next one-hour session.

6.—Finally, while colleagues can be depended on to ask questions in the context of a professional conference, it may help for teachers to develop sets of questions and distribute them in advance so that students can prepare answers from which discussions in the classroom can start. I included questions in my little book, but believe professors should prepare their own to fit their pedagogical situations. Furthermore, students are impressed by reflective analyses that their teacher has herself prepared, so that it is also recommended.

7.—Next it occurred to me to approach over a dozen colleagues who had become familiar with my text through reading, reviewing, and/or translating it and invite them to compose analyses for another textbook that students could learn from. Several of these colleagues reported, however, that they found this challenge to engage in phenomenological investigation difficult and two asked for some suggestions on how to proceed. The present analysis is my attempt to comply with that request. In it I describe how I myself compose reflective analyses, but let me emphasize that this is merely my way and not the only way.

8.—**Step 1.—Find an issue!** If one is prepared in a discipline, there will be issues on which to reflect that arise in one’s field, but more generally speaking, we live in socio-cultural worlds and these have many aspects, large and small, that also invite reflection. With respect to nursing in the former connection, for example, a famous topic is how caring differs from curing, but this otherwise quite excellent topic is too large for present purposes. Here the need is for a modest topic that readers are likely to be familiar with from everyday life, have probably not reflected on previously, and about which something interesting can be said in about ten pages.

9.—What occurred to me as a suitable issue on the present occasion is how we not only encounter what might be called “permanent home bases,” but also various sorts of “temporary home bases.” What these expressions refer to should
become clearer as I proceed. This issue comes from everyday life, is metaphorically named, and does not seem specific to one discipline, but might be relevant for several. Some reflective analysis of how such things are encountered as well as the encountering of them can illustrate how I develop a reflective analysis and I hope this will encourage and guide others.

10.—Where the frame of reference and terminology are concerned, I use “encountering” as a broad technical expression for something within which willing, valuing, believing, and various sorts of experiencing can be discerned and I use “thing(s)-as-encountered” in order to include the correlative uses, values, the characteristics of being believed in, and the different manners of givenness, e.g., those of things-as-expected and things-as-recollected. Many use “experience” or even “lived experience” to express this signification, but sometimes these colleagues are slow to mention the components of willing and valuing in their analyses, which I try not to be.

11.—Step 2.—Find a good example! Examples or illustrations are often useful in conveying one’s thought to others. But at one extreme some expositions include no examples at all and then one can be unsure what is being analyzed and, at the other extreme, many expositions include too many examples and then the illustrations distract from or even seem substitutes for the expression of concepts. Thus, in discussions of art some colleagues sometimes seem to try to describe merely through offering examples. Having one main example and returning to it repeatedly in the course of an exposition usually seems to serve the purpose of drawing attention to what the example exemplifies best. Sometimes I notice a concrete case that becomes my chief example before I conceive of and begin to analyze my issue.

12.—Once I have an issue, it is usually not difficult to find a good running example. In the present case, for example, I have often traveled to other cities and slept in a hotel and then gone out from there to other places for various purposes and this behavior is similar to what I do where I live, which is sleep in and venture out from and then return to my house. My house can be said to be my permanent home base and the hotels where I sleep when I travel are temporary home bases. Where home bases are concerned, there can be secondary as well as primary ones. The first is probably where one keeps such things as clothing, usually eats breakfast and supper, and sleeps most nights. The second might be one’s office or another place where one regularly spends large parts of one’s day and also ventures
out from and returns to. There may be more than one secondary permanent home base in one’s life.

13.—I once taught a course in another country for a week and my hotel was then my temporary home base and I traveled out from there to other places, including various restaurants and the classroom in which I met with students. The classroom, but not any of the restaurants, could be considered a secondary temporary home base. Home bases, permanent or temporary, are places that are central in relation to the other locations. One not only goes out from but also returns back home to them.

14.—It is already clear that “permanent” and “temporary” are relative terms. While one confidently expects to return again and again over long periods of time, possibly during one’s whole life, to a primary permanent home base, a temporary home base is used for a short while, perhaps a day or even less. Permanent home bases become highly familiar, while temporary ones tend to be less familiar, and there may be other differences. More generally, bases of various degrees of permanence and originality belong to the systems of places in which we stop and go through in our lives. How other systems of places, if there are any, may be structured does not need to be pursued here. Permanent and temporary home bases form the issue for this investigation.

15.—Step 3.—Unpack major metaphors! A great many metaphors occur in language, and it is futile to try to reduce all of them to literal expressions. But one should at least comment on major metaphors, either when they might mislead or when it otherwise serves expository purposes to do so. Thus, for example, the expression “home base” is borrowed from the sport of baseball, which is one of the most internationally familiar sports. The home base is the place in the playing field where a batter stands and tries to hit the ball that is pitched to her and if she succeeds, it is the place from which she tries to move around the other three bases with the ultimate goal of returning “home” and thus scoring a run. In effect, the beginning of analysis in Step 2 has already unpacked this metaphor to a considerable extent.

16.—Questions about what a metaphor literally refers to can be useful not only in composing questions for students, but also in developing one’s analysis. Thus, what sorts of places are the positions of the baseball players when their team is on defense, i.e., when members of the opposing team are successively up to bat, what sort of a place is the bench where players wait their turns at bat? (Could the
bench be more of a home base than what is officially called “home base”?), how do these places relate, what besides the activities performed within or in relation to them determine what they are, and are there similar structures in other sports, e.g., are there a “home bases” in billiards or basketball?

17.—**Step 4.—Reflect!** What I do at this stage I tend to call not only “reflecting” but also “pondering” or even “mulling things over.” This is the most important step and unfortunately the one on which I can offer least guidance. The goal is a description of what is chiefly involved in things of the kind that one thematizes and that one’s example exemplifies. The reflecting actually began when one chose a theme and it continues until one has finished writing, but for me at least there comes a time when my account is clear enough that I can start trying to write it out. This is not to say that everything to be said is understood before writing. In the present case, the remarks about how permanent and temporary home bases are a type of place was not originally recognized and thus were added during the first revision of my exposition.

18.—Sometimes the reflective analysis is an answer to an obviously significant question. In a previous analysis, for example, I attempted to answer the question of what tolerance is; the major insight I came to in my pondering this issue focused on how, when one is tolerant, one does not cease to disvalue the person, attitude, or behavior that is tolerated, but, for some reason, one nevertheless does not act on that disvaluing. The question of what might deter one’s willing against what one continues to disvalue could then be approached.

19.—For me at least, there are three things to avoid while reflecting. One is extensive consideration of what others have said about the issue. Of course we have always already learned much from and are thus willingly under the influence of others and scholars can often discern the effects of such influence in our analyses. But in a reflective analysis one ought not to use the names of others (as I have just done!) to help persuade a reader or hearer about something. It may not be possible utterly to preclude allusion to others, but in a reflective analysis the author speaks for herself about the things at issue rather than expounding what others have said. Guiding students into attempting their own investigations has priority, moreover, over impressing professional colleagues.

20.—Another thing that I find it best to avoid is seeking a thesis from which to deduce consequences in a logical way. On my view at least, a reflective analysis is not, *sensu strictu*, an argument, but rather a descriptive narrative at the end of
which the reader has not a deduced conclusion but has rather gained deeper insight into the things in question. Like scholarship on what others have expressed, it may go against one’s training to avoid what can be called “premise hunting” and “logical critique,” but I suggest that there is a third approach in which neither logical form nor the opinions of others are central. Instead, one’s concern can focus on the things at issue, e.g., the attitude of tolerance or the encountering of permanent and temporary home bases.

21.—The third thing that I find useful to avoid in pondering is rushing to employ the set of distinctions in my book, which it may seem odd for the author of a book to say, but I am cognizant that phenomenological results are ultimately refined from everyday encounterings of things in the lifeworld, that I cannot possibly have recognized all of the important differences among things, that technical language is analogously refined from ordinary language, and that one ought not to consider any analysis definitive. My 200-page book only sketches the surface and deeper digging is always needed.

22.—Step 5.—Make distinctions in relation to the example! Distinction making is involved from the outset. It may yield an outline either in one’s mind, as it is said, or on paper in which one works out the order in which things need to be described. I have done this in order to distinguish the steps in this analysis. Some people never do this, others always do it, and I tend to do it the more complicated the things are and the less advanced my pondering is (and doing so does not always hasten my effort!). Sometimes the analysis seems best arranged in a systematic way, so that one goes from general to specific, sometimes it best proceeds from specific to general, and various combinations are possible. What earns a reflective analysis the title of “analysis” is the series of distinctions clarified by using examples with reference to aspects of the thing at issue.

23.—Thus, beyond the distinction between permanent and temporary home bases stands the question of what a place is. Clearly, a place is something located in space and time, e.g., on this or that street between when it was established and when it will be demolished. A place can also be sensuously perceived, e.g., heard to have a distinctive sound or the thick carpet touched with one’s feet when one stands and walks about in it, but it can also be recollected when one has permanently or temporarily left it and it can be expected when one is going to it for the first time or, somewhat differently, when one is returning to it. More can be
said about a place on this level. Such a level, which can be called “experiencing,” is abstracted from encountering, which has other components within it.

24.—When one perceives a place or anything else in spatio-temporality, it is also believed in with certainty unless and until there is motivation to doubt it, e.g., until it proves to be a mirage or other illusion. As a rule, home bases are, furthermore, positively valued. Even if one’s home base is a prison cell, it may be thus valued because it is safer than anywhere else in the prison. Most importantly, places and thus home bases are, in a broad signification, willed. They may be actively willed when, e.g., one chooses one’s own hotel, or passively willed, when one accepts the hotel chosen by one’s host. Beyond that, willing can become habitual or even traditional. One may find upon reflection that the house one lives in has long been volitionally accepted in a routine way.

25.—To use an interesting synonym, things that are in this broad signification can be said to be “used.” Thus a home base can be used to rest in and otherwise prepare for the next going out to other places and thereby serve as a means to the ultimate ends of a larger effort and it can also be used as the immediate end of one’s initial or subsequent movement to it within that effort. Reflection discloses that things-as-willed have characteristics that can be called intrinsic and extrinsic uses.

26.—As said, we sometimes use places not only as permanent home bases but as temporary home bases. This can relate to specific technology. A ship can have a homeport and use another port temporarily. It is similar with airplanes and airports and with garages at home and at work for automobiles. And bases if not all places involve routes for movement between them. If we reflectively analyze how we encounter places in general and permanent and temporary home bases specifically, we can find and describe much about the encountering and the thing-as-encountered involved.

Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>home bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temporary</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
27.—Sometimes a diagram in which distinctions are combined can help not only the reader to comprehend the description but also motivate an author to extend it. Further aspects of the issue can be recognized during the construction of a diagram. For example, it can be asked in relation to Figure 1 if there are differences between permanent and temporary for places other than home bases. Also, how might this diagram be modified to accommodate primary and secondary home bases?

28.—**Step 6.—Revise the exposition!** Here again, one needs to resist the temptation to mention authorities, quote or cite texts, and otherwise engage in scholarship. What one needs to do is to describe what can be observed and analyzed reflectively. The great hope is that the reader or hearer will reflectively look for herself, see the things that one describes, and thus be persuaded by them and by nothing else. There are permanent and temporary home bases and other places where people do different things in their lives. This may not be an earth-shaking insight, but it may at least slightly advance one’s understanding of what it is to live in a socio-cultural world, in what phenomenologists call a “lifeworld.”

29.—It is nowise precluded that new aspects of things come under consideration during the composition process. Thus a lifeworld is not only cultural in the strict signification of its contents having uses, values, and belief characteristics that are learned, but is also social. This raises the question of how social relationships and interactions play a role and might even predominate in what makes a place to be of one type or another. To continue with our example, can one’s home not be where one’s family is and is getting home then not actually more a matter of rejoining one’s spouse and children after having been away than of entering a building, even if being away consists in staying at second base until the end of the inning of baseball and thus not being with one’s team on the bench or in the field? Can it be a home if one does not share it with others but lives alone with one’s important things, such as one’s books, and performs the activities one cares most about in that place, such as where one not only eats and sleeps but also watches television and composes reflective analyses in the morning before going to the university to teach?

30.—Then again, a military formation that is in movement can be the home base for a patrol that is sent out and returns with information on the enemy and it can be similar with a fleet and its scout planes. Thus, a temporary home base may have a changing rather than fixed place in experienced space-time, while the
permanent home base is a barracks or a homeport. Or could some permanent home bases also be always in movement?

31.—Step 7.—Examine the draft! This is where I hope that my book will be most useful. But, again, I hope that it is remembered that my results there are only a surface map on the basis of which one can dig deeper and that others should not hesitate to do so. Let me offer some questions derived from it that one can ask in relation to a draft of a reflective analysis. This might at least help one become more confident of the general coverage.

a.—Is the difference between experiencing and positing, on the one hand, and things-as-experienced and things-as-posed, on the other hand, relevant and explicit in the draft?

b.—Where relevant, is the distinction between the experiencing of real or, better, temporal and of ideal or, better, atemporal things made clearly?

c.—Concerning real things, are perceiving, remembering, and expecting and the correlative things-as-perceived, things-as-remembered, and things-as-expected and their degrees of importance considered?

d.—Are believing, valuing, and willing and their correlates and modalities taken into account where pertinent?

e.—Is the role of feigning in the investigation appreciated explicitly or implicitly, i.e., is one aware of the difference between claims about individual things, be they serious or fictive, and general insights gained on the basis of them as examples?  

f.—Is there need in the analysis for justification and if so, is that need supplied? And if not, why not?

g.—Is the exposition so constructed that the student gains deeper and deeper insight as she works her way through it?

32.—Steps 4 and 5 seem to me the most important and yet the least methodical. I cannot regularly predict how long it will take for my analysis of an issue to settle down enough to be written. And the circumstances vary. Some get ideas while driving to work, others while struggling with insomnia or while brushing their teeth, etc., etc. Perhaps the most important thing about the approach

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9 Was it necessary to go out and observe permanent and temporary home bases or was it sufficient in the running example of this essay to recollect them and, beyond that, to engage sometimes in feigning particular cases? Are the claims here about whether this or that place is a home base of one or the other type or about what the genus and species of home bases are?
that I find that I follow is that the writing down and the examination in terms of the seven questions in Step 7 only help after the pondering is basically finished.

33.—Your way of proceeding is likely different from mine. Are you as surprised as I am about how much can be said like this in about 3,000 words? Students can be expected to master that much before coming to class the next day for discussion with one another as well as with their teacher. If we can provide enough concrete practice as well as methodological study, we can not only fill a semester of teaching but also possibly produce some new phenomenologists who would show that they deserve that title by composing their own reflective analyses.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

34.—Those sophisticated in phenomenology will have recognized that I do not clarify many important things in the above analysis. This is because I am concerned with fostering what is basic to our approach. Thus I do not devote a page or two to the difference between straightforward thematizing and reflective thematizing, but instead rely on the ability of normal human adults to recognize how analysis of what I call encountering and things-as-encountered is different from how we often just self-obliviously discuss so-called “objective things” with no concern with how they are encountered by us. But I do distinguish the believing, valuing, and willing components from the experiential ones within encounterings and the correlative belief characteristics, values, and uses from the manners of givenness within the things-as-encountered.

35.—Furthermore, I do not address whether the analysis I offer pertains to worldly or to transcendental phenomenology. On my view, reflective analysis can be specified for different purposes and there are over three dozen disciplines with phenomenological tendencies. One’s purpose can be the transcendental grounding of the world but there are different purposes in other versions of philosophical phenomenology as well as in disciplines beyond philosophy, e.g., phenomenological nursing. Tacitly, however, at least psychological epochē, reduction, and purification is relied on above, for I make no allusion to how what is experienced can be explained in terms of photons, sound waves, and other factors of central interest in physiological psychology and naturalistic science.

36.—Similarly, I do not raise the question of the derivation of egological phenomenology from intersubjective phenomenology or otherwise allude to the
Abbau–Aufbau method. Except for an allusion to the origin of secondarily passive willing in active and passive volitional operations, the analysis above is also a piece of static phenomenology.

37.—Then again, most colleagues in our tradition simply take it for granted that phenomenology is about individual human consciousness. I could but did not analyze how individual lives are distinguished from those of others in the groups in which we originally live or how human differs from non-human life.

38.—Here and in other reflective analyses I also rely implicitly on eidetic method, but I also do not say much if anything about what this is. That I do rely on it is indicated by how what I try to convey is not merely about some particular thing, e.g., such and such a hotel in this or that city, but even at the most specific level any hotel in any place traveled to and stayed at for a short while. More generally, there are eide of permanent and temporary home bases. Husserl’s description of eideation and of the clarifying power of free phantasy variation is the best methodology that has been developed in this connection thus far. But I am also convinced that normal human adults regularly eideate spontaneously and not only express concepts about universal essences quite often but also comprehend such concepts with ease. To dwell on this procedure would distract from what is fundamental to the basic approach I hope the student can learn.

39.—What is fundamental is reflecting on, analyzing, and describing in specific and general terms the encounterings and the correlative things-as-encountered that pertain to an issue. Once one learns to do that, additional procedures that might be followed involved can be considered.
A Way to Teach Reflective Analysis

INTRODUCTION

1.—The title of this investigation is ambiguous. “Reflective Analysis” could allude to my book, *Reflective Analysis*, which was written to be taught to students even though it could also be studied by someone no longer a student in an effort at self-instruction. Then again, however, the approach that the expression and the book refer to or are about also is properly called “reflective analysis.” So this effort might be about a book or it might be about a research approach. Either way, the title is taken, this essay is about teaching in relation to reflective analysis.

2.—This essay has two parts. The first is about a way of teaching that is widespread with respect to phenomenology, which is a more traditional but less obviously methodological name for reflective analysis and, it will be contended, does not teach the approach very well. Then the second part is about how to teach the approach. The goal is not to produce more scholars of phenomenology but rather more phenomenologists, more investigators in phenomenology, of which there are actually not remarkably many today.

TEACHING ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY

3.—Although there has been phenomenology in philosophy for well over a century and also in more and more disciplines beyond philosophy, psychiatry first of all, for almost as long, there are proportionally fewer and fewer phenomenologist in the strict sense currently, something that seems not widely recognized but deserves to be.

4.—To be sure there are a great many books and articles devoted to telling what phenomenology is and many conferences in which colleague talk about this or that aspect of what this or that giant phenomenologist in the past has written or said about something or other. Sadly, some of these meetings resemble nothing more than bible study groups in which some past giant or other is regarded as if
s/he were a god. The general approach taken seems most generously called “scholarship” and the literary products include comparative studies, editions, interpretations, reviews, and translations. There is certainly a great need for scholarship in the phenomenological tradition because the works of most past giants are difficult to understand. This is in part because there is little common terminology, not just the same words, but also the same concepts. And if one considers a major problematics, e.g., the experiencing of Others, one quickly recognizes that there is rather little agreement among the past giants and thus, perhaps, that comparative studies are the most needed where scholarship is concerned. Nevertheless, truth be told, works of scholarship are only contributions to the secondary literature. They are about or on phenomenology and not in it. Sadly, their authors often do not understand this even though it is a characteristic of greatness in those who are studied.

5.—Graduate students and beginning academics are probably best encouraged to produce scholarship. If they are mortally subject to the judgments of others, especially others from non-phenomenological schools of thought, it is safest to talk about what a credible past giant thought rather than to hold overtly an original position in one’s discipline on an issue or method. For example, logic is at best of marginal significance in phenomenological method, but central to what is investigated by Edmund Husserl, for example, but saying so to an analytical philosopher may instantly lose her attention regarding the rest of what one has to say. Or even to say one relies fundamentally on reflective observation of mental processes or is deeply interested in how individuals are members of social groups can get one dismissed as an introspectionist or sociologist—which is considered worse by most Anglophone philosophers is difficult to say. So scholarship is safer when one is vulnerable. And good scholarship is easier to appreciate from other points of view.

6.—Somewhat naturally, then, phenomenology can chiefly be talked about rather than done. For example, one might talk as follows about Edmund Husserl’s *Cartesianische Meditationen*: As the master’s last assistant and collaborator somewhere says, this is a repetition of Husserl’s *Ideen*, it began as a lecture at the Sorbonne and was structured to honor France’s greatest philosopher, relied from early on not only on the transcendental phenomenological *epochē*, reduction, and purification, but also tacitly the egological *epochē*, reduction, and purification, whereas the eidetic *epochē*, reduction, and purification, which was prominently the
theme of Part I of the First Book of the *Ideen*, is curiously relegated to the “IVth Meditation.” Until abandoned for the sake of the *Krisis*, which addresses not solely the project of *Wissenschaftslehre* strictly as also the terrible times of the 1920s and ‘30s especially in post-World War I Germany, Husserl thought of it as a final statement. As for the whole text, it is actually two texts, one a fairly continuous analysis in the first four “Meditationen,” the fourth of which, as just intimated, containing in effect various appendices to the case made in “Meditationen I-III,” and the other a treatise on the constitution of Others. And many consider this work essentially epistemological and intellectualist, although if one looks closely there are some allusions to phenomenological value theory and action theory in it.

7.—The above paragraph might be interesting, but does it show how to do phenomenology? In its spirit one might go on to elaborate on the methodological statements, e.g., eidetic *epochē*, reduction, and purification, saying that Husserl held from early on that we can in some way see universal essences *à la Plato*, although this “seeing” is founded on a serious or fictive experiencing of a particular case that is then an example of the universal essence or *eidos*. Moreover, Husserl substantially advanced the methodology of eidetic evidencing by describing the role that so-called “free phantasy variation” plays in the clarification of what can then be called a “pure essence.” But does this show how to see an essence?

8.—I fear that the reader has read or heard so many statements like those just offered that s/he has difficulty conceiving another sort. After all, devotees to Aristotle or Hegel seldom go on to offer Aristotelian or Hegelian accounts of things that these figures did not ponder. Can one teach the doing of reflective analysis rather than what it is about?

**SOME QUESTIONING**

9.—Perhaps the following way of teaching is Socratic because it involves questioning by the teacher and seeks to develop insights in students. Generally speaking, however, Socrates also assumed, I believe, that interlocutors had vague understandings and asked them for examples to clarify them, but I have found that this works. In this approach I tell students that I will be asking questions about the central analysis in *Reflective Analysis* and expecting answers with good examples and then I proceed systematically. Besides the following list of questions there are
follow-up questions included in parentheses and the instructor is encouraged to
develop more. Some of the following questions are “trick questions,” i.e.,
questions that have false assumptions because students need to beware of such
questions.

#1. What is common to experiencing of all sorts and to positionality of all
sorts and how do they differ specifically? (How is this question like asking about
plants and animals? But are the things asked about concretely different or only
abstractly? What does this follow-up question signify? And as I proceed I watch
the other students to see whether they are agreeing or not with the student
answering and often ask some of them what examples they are thinking of.)

#2. There are two species of experiencing and three subspecies in each
species, but, to begin with, what do the species share and how do they differ?
(What are the unobservables involved in either of these? Can we observe these in
Others in any way or only in ourselves? Must our examples be serious or can they
be fictive?)

#3. Is there a reason for beginning with direct experiencing? And among the
three types of experiencing is there a reason for beginning with perceiving?

#4. How is perceiving different from recollecting and expecting? (Must
experiencing be only of physical things? How do the intermediaries vary in these
three types?)

#5. Are the intermediaries different for indirect experiencing than for direct
experiencing? (What is different about the experiencings involved in indirect
experiencing as opposed to direct experiencing?)

#6. Suppose that one recollects something twice. Is the thing recollected then
the same thing or are there two things and how does it (or do them) differ? (Can
the same questions be asked about a thing (or things) in the future and if so, what
is/are the answer(s)? Do not forget to use examples as much as possible.)

#7. Must the objects of the three sorts of indirect experiencing be in distinct
temporal zones like the objects of direct experiencing must be? Here, if there are
three types of experiencing of realities and three temporal zones (construct a 3 x 3
cross-classification), what are examples that fit the nine bi-determinant classes?
(Are all objects of experiencing realities and if not then are three or six more
classes of examples called for and if so, then what are they?)

#8. Are there degrees of negative and neutral as well as positive assurance
for believing? Can the degree of assurance change?
9. The same questions for valuing and for willing?
10. How are liking and loving similar and different? Are there degrees of valuing?
11. Can one will to will? Like to believe? What other compounds are like this?
12. Can one like and will to remember and perceive? Can there be encountering in which such reflexivities do not occur?
13. Can one’s own organism be perceived in more than one way? Visually? Autorially? Tactually? Privately?
14. What must happen in the organism for one to see and touch one’s foot? Can one perceive the back of one’s own head? How or if not, why not?
15. How is touching the hand of an Other like and unlike touching one’s own hand?
16. What happens to a smell when one holds one’s nose?
17. How are a bed and a chair similar and different? Gloves and shoes?
18. How can something appear larger and louder when the distance between it and one’s organism decreases?
19. Other than through language, how can one be sure an Other perceives the same thing?
20. How can one be sure a thing is not alive? If one cannot, then why not?
Closing Remark:

The Need for Reflective Analyses

During the past 40 years I have attended probably four phenomenology conferences a year and heard at least six presentations at each of them. This is nearly 1,000 presentations in addition to which I have read at least that many journal articles and book chapters that are considered phenomenological in these years as well. On this basis I can report that practically all these expressions that are considered phenomenological are actually scholarship in which often penetrating interpretations of the usually difficult writings by giants in the past of our tradition are offered. I greatly enjoy hearing and reading such scholarship and have myself contributed several dozen items to it where Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz as well as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre and even the American proto-phenomenologist William James are concerned, and not only do I happily participate in this scholarship, but I also recognize that it is and will always be deeply needed to help us gain maximum benefit from our great past. And where scholarship is concerned, I only wish there was more that is comparative of aspects of the positions of our giants because this would, I believe, foster more phenomenology.

However, almost all of what I have just referred to is fundamentally of the type of research best called scholarship. I often use “philology” as a synonym for “scholarship” because it nicely contrasts with “phenomenology.” This scholarship or philology is secondary and not primary literature. To be sure, many of the interpretations I have heard and read indicate commitments to pre-established positions, usually that of the author of the text interpreted. What is rare are objections to this or that aspect of the position interpreted and rarer still are phenomenological alternatives offered to those aspects objected to, which is to say phenomenological corrections, not to speak of deepening extensions of the descriptions of the things in question.

Where agreement with the position interpreted is indicated, it is also rare that this agreement is said to be based on reflective observation of the things in question. I have gently challenged friends within our tradition in this respect and
have sometimes been told that they can see the things in question even as they interpret these texts by others. When I follow up by asking why they did not say that or, more importantly, go on to refine the position they have interpreted, my friends have typically had no answer. Nor have they answers when I ask if they have phenomenological objections, objections based on observation of the things themselves in question.

An interpretation is as such true if what is asserted in it can be found expressed or implied in the writings of the author of them. (Interestingly, this can be by the same author as the author interpreting them, e.g., when one of her earlier texts is interpreted by an author.) If what is asserted in the scholarship cannot be found in the texts of the author interpreted, then the interpretation as such is false. It might nevertheless be true of the things themselves in question, but this is not the same as being true of the texts.

In contrast with scholarship or philology, which again is true or false with respect to texts already produced, the species of accounts produced in what I prefer to call “investigations”—and which in our tradition are often called “descriptions”—are true or false with respect to things. It is possible that the things in question are texts and in that case one pursues such questions as What is a text? How do texts or speeches refer to things as well as to other texts or speeches? How is a text true or false with respect to texts or speeches as well as to other things? etc. and thus develop a phenomenology of interpretation or hermeneutics. Usually, however, a description is true or false of a thing in question other than a text and its truth or falsity is judged in phenomenology on the basis of reflective observation of the things in question.

The upshot of what I am saying is that very little of what is or would be called by its author “phenomenology” in the perhaps 2,000 expressions I have heard or read down through my years in our tradition is not phenomenology at all, but rather scholarship or philology. Here, as mentioned, I am somewhat guilty, although since my first essay and increasingly of late I have been trying to produce phenomenological texts in a genre that I now call “reflective analyses.” These are about things themselves and written in such a way that I hope the hearer or reader does not in effect ask “Where does a great figure from the past express what is here being asserted interpretively?” but is rather turned to the things in question and asks whether they are as I have asserted they are. Mentions of major authorities, quotations, and footnotes are among the ways in which one can direct one’s hearer
or reader to examine what one expresses as a piece of scholarship, whereas it is best to include little or none of such “scholarly apparatus” in a description or reflective analysis based on reflective analysis of the things in question.

If one asks about the audience of the ca. 2,000 speeches and texts I have tried to comprehend down through the years, the answer is easily found: They are typically my fellow professional colleagues who are conversant about such technical scholarship and thus belong to a given specialty, school of thought, or at least discipline. If one asks in contrast whom investigations rather than scholarship might also be addressed to, one can include hearers and readers not necessarily versed in technical apparatuses and then one can think of professional colleagues in other specialties, schools of thought, or disciplines, but, above all, one can think of students. Set aside professional colleagues, what do students learn besides how to do scholarship if all of what they hear and read is scholarship? Is it anything other than how to do more scholarship and are the methods of scholarship not text interpretation rather than reflective observation of things in question, which are usually not texts? Not surprisingly, a few colleagues have wondered whether our magnificent tradition is not degenerating into merely a curious type of history of 20th C. philosophy. To avoid that, I assert that we need a great deal of teaching as well as writing not of philology but phenomenology or, again, reflective analysis. I have of course published a text in now ten languages, with more to come, on what I believe reflective analysis to be and I even fancy that it is a reflective analysis of the approach of reflective analysis. (I have encouraged translations into the smaller as well as the world languages of Castilian, English, French, Portuguese, and Russian because, while ever more of the professional-to-professional communication is in English, colleagues tell me that they mostly teach in their local languages and can use more written materials in those languages for the sake of their students.) My text acknowledges the figures I have learned from in one paragraph, has only one footnote, and no quotations. (See Introduction above)

And, to be sure, I am not the first to produce texts that fit this genre, for lots of them can be found in our tradition, beginning at least in The Principles of Psychology (1890) of William James. By the way, the giants of our tradition whom we should emulate did very little scholarship.

What I hope happens is that these descriptions by me and by others are taught by being assigned one at a time to advanced undergraduate or graduate
students for study the night before and then seminar sessions conducted by the instructor in Socratic fashion by asking such things as What is the theme of this reflective analysis? Is there a better name for it? Have you ever pondered it before? Can you find in your own mental life serious or fictive examples of the things in question? Are they as described in this reflective analysis? If they are not, how might they be better described? Do you find corrections and refinements that have been expressed by fellow students true? If you find them true as far as they go, can you advance them further, i.e., refine them yourself with description based on further reflective analysis? We all have some sense of our mental lives to begin with and can then, especially with help, go on to refine it with extensive practice into skill. In this way, I hope that there can be more phenomenologists rather than philologists produced in the future. The need is for more phenomenologists and reflective analyses are a means to the end of supplying this need.

I do not currently teach doctoral students, but if I did, I would first of all teach them reflective analysis and thus to be phenomenologists. But I would also encourage them chiefly to publish scholarship once they graduated and until they got tenure. This is because scholarship is easier to do and more can be produced year by year, because it is easier for colleagues in other schools of thought to understand, and because it is safer because supported by passages written by recognized authorities rather than by one’s own reflective observations that call for confirmation through reflective analysis by others. But I would also advise them to remember once they have gotten tenure to produce more and more phenomenology and thus to be the phenomenologists they prepared to be.

One reason why students and many already established professionals sometimes hesitate to produce phenomenology is because the giants of the past have often produced daunting book-length analyses, which few of us feel able to emulate. But I urge that we consider reflecting to begin with on things the understanding of which can be advanced in perhaps a dozen pages, which is something that I have tried to do. Other reasons why one might hesitate to try to do phenomenology rather than philology must include what one has become deeply in the habit of doing and also what one sees others do. But if one looks again at what the giants of our marvelous past have done, one can also see short as well as long reflective analyses and one can then resist conformism and find the courage to struggle against habit through continual disciplined practice. And no doubt reflective analysis requires practice.
This urging of much more phenomenology and much less philology is nowise original with me. Only my explicit urging of the genre of concise and thing-focused reflective analyses for Socratic teaching in small classes might be unusual. Without skill at reflective analysis being learned and done in the next generation, our tradition is dead.

finis
Reflective Analysis

second edition

The basic contention of *Reflective Analysis* is that phenomenology is most fundamentally an approach, rather than a set of texts or concepts: phenomenologizing involves modes of observation and analysis that we can learn to perform better. The author presents his own account step by step, using everyday examples and dealing not only with perceiving and thinking (leading themes for most phenomenologists), but also with valuing and willing. Many charts and diagrams are used to summarize key distinctions, and the book also includes exercises that help readers refine this approach for themselves. The text
was designed for college students, and there is a “Preface for Instructors” who wish to use the book in the classroom, but others will find this a friendly, helpful “first introduction” that they can study on their own. The work is suitable for students in all disciplines, not just philosophers, and will be especially welcome to any reader who appreciates learning by doing and prefers examples to footnotes.

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Closing Remarks

TO PURCHASE:
analyses. Thus they continue my earlier text, Reflective Analysis (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2006). Although I hope that these essays are also read by colleagues who are without immediate pedagogical purposes, I want strongly to suggest that if they are studied the night before (they average less than 15 pages in length) and then discussed in small study groups or in college seminars, understanding of and skill at reflective analysis will be increased. The leader of such a discussion can regularly ask: Are things themselves observably as they are described? If not, how might they be better described? And if well described as far as they go, how can the descriptions be continued and improved on?

There is an extensive appreciation of culture and hence opposition to naturalism in this text. The attempt is made to clarify the overlapping concepts of environment and technology, which are unfortunately often considered separately by philosophers today. Since these are moral issues, it has seemed appropriate to include at the end two analyses of more general bearing. And since phenomenological exposition is an art of examples, there are references to such things as automobiles, bank robbers, birds, broken legs, gardens, nutcrackers, parks, roads, snakes, taxi drivers, trees, trucks, and vegetarians. Egological phenomenology is practiced for the most part, but the place of intersubjectivity is regularly indicated and noetico-noematic analysis is relied on practically everywhere. Thus encounterings and things-as-encountered are analyzed into experiencings and posittings and experiencings are analyzed into the perceivings, rememberings, and expectings of things in the now, the past, and the future with their manners of givenness and appearance. Then posittings are analyzed into positive, negative, and neutral believing, valuings, and willing or actions (in broad significations) with the firm and shaky and also intrinsic and extrinsic positional characteristics in their correlates distinguished and described. The emphasis is on the prepredicative constitution of what it is urged be called “basic culture,” the difference between I-engaged operations and secondarily passive habits and traditions is recognized, and, despite that these are basically surface analyses, something is nevertheless said about identifying and differentiating intentional syntheses. Finally, the need to carry analysis on beyond epistemology and axiology to praxiology is emphasized in descriptions of how believing, valuing, and willing or action can be directly or indirectly justified by evidencing.
Technology is essentially a form of indirect action and environmentalism culminates in justified political action regarding pollution, overpopulation, preservation, and conservation.

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The purpose of this collection is to show the originality of the phenomenology of Dorion Cairns, arguably Edmund Husserl’s closest disciple. The word “studies” (in the plural) occurs in the subtitle because these studies can each stand alone, which entails some repetition of important passages, and because they vary somewhat in their approaches, some being more essays and some more editions than others. While published essays by Cairns are also drawn on, most of the basis of these
studies are his famous and still unpublished New School lectures in the 1960s, which are quoted from quite extensively.

The studies in this volume show how he thus creatively continued Husserl’s work. The philosophic ideal is revised, the account of the constitution of Others is corrected, the description of sense-transfer extended, the theory of hyletic data is revised, sensa as well as appearances are shown to be adumbrative, aspects of the body that Husserl seemed to have overlooked are described, and original investigations of appearances and of willing are assembled. A methodological description is appended that may help make the emphasis on description and the near absence of argumentation clearer. That description also helps one understand the focus on individual human mental life and the sensuous perceiving of physical things as where to begin. And if they explain away any seeming naturalistic emphasis, the many references to willing and valuing throughout this book should also reduce suspicions of intellectualism. Furthermore, there are no bases for considering phenomenology solipsistic or about disembodied mental lives to be found here. Cairns was deeply impressed by the Abbau-Aufbau method and held that Husserl came to recognize the importance of the primarily passive or automatic infrastratum of mental life too late completely to adjust his concepts. This adjustment of concepts guided Cairns’s effort to bring the thought published by Husserl in his lifetime up to the level of the *Cartesianische Meditationen* and the *Formale und transzendentale Logik*. And he was always endeavoring to develop better terminology for phenomenology in English.

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