



Reason and Emotion

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Editors' Note: This text is edited from pp. 30987–31032 in the Dorion Cairns nachlass held by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology Inc. It was dated “Jan. 11, 1955” by the author on p. 31028 and in a way suggestive of his continuing that day on a writing effort begun at least one day before. He often, but not always, dated pages in his manuscripts. The occasion for its composition and presumed presentation is not clear. In a parentheses excised below, Cairns refers to “the end of the hour,” which might suggest use in teaching. But the lack of signs of continuation with previous presentations (he habitually began each lecture with a summary of the previous lecture or lectures), as well as the unity and, above all, the care manifest in this text suggest a more formal occasion, perhaps a meeting of the General Seminar, an institution of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science at the New School for Social Research, to which faculty Alfred Schutz had the idea of bringing him at least as early as 1953 [Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, *Philosophers in Exile*, ed. Richard Grathoff (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989): p. 219] and where he began teaching in 1954.

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The Editors

1.

Though the title of this essay is “Reason *and* Emotion,” its main theme would be indicated more precisely if it were called “Reason in the *Sphere* of Emotion.” Its purpose is to show that there is indeed reason in the emotional sphere and to clarify its nature – to some extent. Its procedure has been chosen because of the following considerations: Reason manifests itself more obviously in the sphere of belief than in the sphere of emotion. The nature of reason in the sphere of belief is easier to see. Moreover, the similarities and

differences between belief and emotion are such that, once we have clarified to some extent the nature of reason in the sphere of belief, it will be less difficult for us to find reason in the emotional sphere and clarify its nature.

Accordingly, our introductory themes will be: *belief* and reason in the sphere of belief. We shall develop these themes only to the extent necessary to our final purpose.

Let me state beforehand two conclusions which I hope to make plausible. Not infrequently reason and emotion are contrasted – reason being praised to the detriment of emotion, or emotion being exalted while reason is disparaged. The truth is, however, that they are not opposites. On the contrary: some emotions are, *in themselves*, more nearly rational than others – moreover, they are more nearly “rational” in a sense quite analogous to that in which some beliefs are more nearly rational than others. In any sphere, rationality is only an ideal. But approximations to the ideal of rationality can be actualized, not only in the sphere of belief but also in the sphere of emotion. If these conclusions can be established, they are not without importance. At all events, they are relevant to present controversy and to long-standing problems in the general theory of value and in theoretical ethics.

So far as present controversy is concerned, our conclusions will put us roughly in agreement with the people who maintain that value-judgments are based on emotional attitudes. But we shall find ourselves in utter disagreement with those who go on to conclude that, if emotion is the best foundation for value-judgments, then no value-judgment can be known to be true.

The importance of our conclusions for the theory of value can be indicated more precisely by the following considerations. Any non-skeptical theory of value stands or falls with the thesis that some things can be known to be at least probably good. But this thesis, in turn, stands or falls with the thesis that some emotions are approximately rational. Hence, the thesis that some emotions are approximately rational is essential to any tenable non-skeptical theory of value.

But, since it is essential to any tenable non-skeptical theory of value, this thesis is essential also to any tenable non-skeptical ethics. Define ethics as theory of moral *value*, and this follows immediately as a corollary. If, on the other hand, you define ethics as theory of moral *obligation*, then a non-skeptical ethics will stand or fall with the proposition that the actuality of some states of affairs *ought* to be willed – or, if you prefer, the proposition that willing the actuality of some things is rational willing, willing in accordance with “practical reason.” But these propositions, it seems to me, stand or fall with the thesis that some preferential *emotions* are rational.

So much, then, concerning the significance of certain conclusions which I shall try to make plausible.

I must forewarn you that the *extent* to which we shall clarify the nature of emotional reason is small. We shall consider only the formal structure of

simple feelings about the humblest things (though, to be sure, our rudimentary discoveries will have a wider relevance). Moreover, our slight clarifications will continually bring to light new problems, with which we shall not attempt to deal.

After these preliminaries, we now turn to our introductory themes: Belief, and reason in the sphere of belief.

2.

The word “belief” is a name either for believing or for something believed. We shall use it as a name for believing. But the word “believing” is used in either a narrow or a broad sense. “Believing,” in the narrow sense, is *contrasted* with knowing. But knowing, though it is more than *just* believing, *is* believing. In knowing something, one believes it. We shall understand believing in the broad sense, which applies to knowings as well as *mere* believings.

There are different *modes* of belief. Some believings as believings with simple certainty; others are more or less uncertain; still others are believings with a reassured certainty, perhaps after a time during which they were uncertain. Then, contrasted with all these positive modes, we find disbelievings – some of them certain, others uncertain to varying degrees. But, despite the contrast, belief and disbelief are generically alike – as we see by comparing a believing with, on the one hand, a disbelieving and, on the other hand, an emotion or a willing. Now we shall have to refer to the genus that includes believings and disbelievings. In so doing, we shall use the phrase, “believing in the broadest sense.” Relative to believing in the broadest sense, believings in a strict sense are positive believings, and disbelievings might be called “negative believings.” It should be noted that what we call “positive believing” is the opposite of disbelieving; whereas what we call “certain believing” is the opposite of uncertain believing.

One more terminological remark. English idiom involves a verbal distinction between *believing* and *believing in*. We speak simply of *believing* a proposition. On the other hand, we speak of believing in an individual thing. We say, “Conan Doyle *believed* there are ghosts”; on the other hand, we say, “He believed *in* ghosts.” To be sure, our two statements are equivalent: If either is true, the other is true and if either is false, so is the other. But believing there are ghosts is not quite identical with believing in ghosts. The belief object of the former is a proposition about ghosts. The objects of the latter belief are ghosts themselves. And just as ghosts are more fundamental than propositions about them, so believing (or disbelieving) in ghosts is more fundamental than believing (or disbelieving) any proposition about them. Indeed, quite universally, believing or disbelieving in an individual thing is more fundamental than believing any proposition whatever.

We shall avoid some troublesome complications by concentrating our attention on beliefs of the more fundamental kind, namely beliefs in individual things. And, for the sake of further simplicity, we shall concentrate more particularly on simply certain positive believings in such things. But we believe in individual things of various kinds. Among them the simplest, perhaps, are everyday purely physical things – that is to say, such concrete wholes as sticks and stones and the individual parts, qualities, relations, and other determinations of such concreta. Accordingly let us focus our attention still more narrowly: on simply certain believings in everyday physical things. In thus narrowing our field of actual inquiry, we do not necessarily deprive our answers of a broader relevance.

And now we are ready to take *reason* into consideration. We ask the following question: When is believing in a particular physical thing, as having a particular determination, *rational*?

Much as we have simplified our inquiry, we cannot give this question a simple answer. Our answer must be qualified: Believing in a thing as having a particular determination, we answer, has *prima facie* rationality, when it is not only a believing in but also a *perceiving of* that thing – a perceiving of it as presented in respect of that particular determination. For example: Believing is something as having a red surface is a *prima facie* rational believing when it is a believing-seeing of the thing as having a presented red surface.

The answer is qualified. It states a condition, not for absolute rationality but a condition for *prima facie* or presumptive rationality. Furthermore, our answer states not a necessary but only a sufficient condition for presumptive rationality.

Let us consider these points separately. Such a believing has only *prima facie* rationality, because actually perceiving something as having this or that presented determination does not preclude the possibility of perceiving the same thing with another presented determination that would be incompatible with the one *now* presented. Actually seeing a thing as having a presented red surface does not preclude the possibility of seeing the same surface of the thing as blue. When such a conflicting perception occurs, the presumption of rationality in the first belief may be weakened or even canceled. And, since there is always the possibility of such a cancellation, we must say that the rationality of the first belief is *only* *prima facie* or presumptive. Whether or not the presumption of rationality in the belief will indeed be canceled by an active conflicting perception depends on which of the two perceptions is the “better” (and on how much better it is). The better the *perceiving*, the stronger the presumption of rationality in the *believing*. (It is possible to state conditions that make one perception superior to another. To do so now, however, would obscure our main line of thought here).

At all events, if the presumption of rationality in a particular belief becomes canceled that is because a stronger presumption of rationality attaches to a conflicting belief.

Now the fact is that only rarely does the confronting of one sensuous perceiving with others result in a drawn battle of reason. On the whole and in the long run the vast majority of sensuous perceivings do in fact *confirm* one another; while most of the small minority that disagree with them (and often with one another) are discredited, without hope of ever regaining status. Let us be thankful that experience has gone on for us so far in this relatively harmonious fashion; and – for the present – let us not ask *why* it has. At the same time let us not forget that, so far as belief in *any particular item* is concerned, there always remains *in principle* the possibility that the presumptive rationality of belief therein may turn out to have been *only* presumptive.

Ultimately, the rational belief or disbelief (certain or uncertain, as the case may be) would be the one whose rationality had been established by all the possible relevant perceivings – each given its due weight. But it is impossible for all of them to become actual; and therefore an *absolutely* rational believing in a particular physical thing as having a particular determination is something ideal, something that cannot be actualized, although approximations to it can be actualized and there is a rational method for improving them.

So much by way of explanation of what we meant by saying that we had stated a condition, not for absolute, but for *prima facie* rationality. We said also that we had stated not a necessary, but *only a sufficient condition* for such rationality.

To explain this second point, let us consider an example: In merely seeing something as an ordinary apple, I believe in it as something having not only this presented shape and this presented surface-color, but also a *nonpresented taste of a particular kind*. No taste *at all* is *presented*. Nevertheless my believing in the seen thing as having an apple-taste is not *irrational*. It does not conflict with belief in something presented. And I should be most reluctant to call it non-rational, though I should be hard put to say precisely wherein its presumptive rationality consists. At all events, if it does indeed have presumptive rationality, that rationality *ranks lower* than the *prima facie* rationality of my believing in the thing as having this presented shape and color. My belief in the thing as having an apple-taste would attain the same level of *prima facie* rationality, only if the thing were tasted and an apple-taste were *presented*. Indeed, it seems to me that the *prima facie* rationality of belief in what is presented is *prima facie* rationality of the highest imaginable order.

Besides such cases as that of belief in the non-presented apple-taste, there are other cases of presumptive rationality that rank below the highest type. Without the circumlocutions that would be necessary for precision, we may say that the believing involved in a clear remembering of a perceiving – yes,

even the believing involved in accepting the testimony of a credible witness – is a believing that has presumptive rationality, though of a lower order. I mention these cases not merely, or even mainly, to forestall the objection that the problem of rational belief is being conceived too simply. I mention them mainly because there are analogous cases and problems in the emotional sphere.

We shall have occasion to amplify some of our statements about belief in general and rational belief in particular incidentally to the consideration of our major theme – to which we are about to direct our attention.

3.

Emotions, sentiments, passions, affections, feelings – these make up a class that is more diversified than the class of believings, even in the broader sense. Indeed, as the variety of mentioned names suggests, it is not so readily apparent that the class of emotions also represents a single genus. Fortunately, we need not consider problems that arise in this connection. We shall be dealing not with the specific material content of emotions but with their formal structures.

Various as are the things that might be styled “emotions” or “quasi-emotions,” at least many varieties are alike in one respect: they are intrinsically characterized as related to or directed to something or other. Moreover, in this respect they are like beliefs. Just as believing is believing something, or believing in something, so loving is loving *something*, and hating is hating *something*. To be sure, the object of an emotion may be meant indeterminately. One may fear, for example, “one knows not what.” Again, in respect of its object, an emotion may be highly inclusive or shifting. One may be pleased with the universe or annoyed at each thing that comes along. But, when one takes such extreme cases into account, the class of emotions that *relate* to something turns out to be more inclusive than one might expect it to be.

Moreover, of these directed emotions, some are analogous to believings in a second and related respect. It was hardly necessary to point out that believings, in the broadest sense, are either positive believings or else disbelievings, or – as we might say – they are either acceptings or rejectings of their respective objects. And, as their everyday names often indicate, many *emotions* come in analogously anti-thetical pairs. Indeed, even where precise opposites are lacking, directed emotions are generally describable as either acceptive or rejective, either positive or negative – and, in the case of a *mixed* emotion, positive or negative components are often distinguishable.

Finally, we may note a third point of analogy between belief and emotion – still without asserting that a formal analogy holds between beliefs for *every-*

thing that might be called “emotion.” Like believings and disbelievings, directed emotions can be more or less *certain* in the acceptance or rejection of their objects. A feeling of approval, for example, may be a *certain* approval, or else in one degree or another an *uncertain* approval. I am not speaking here of certainty and uncertainty as to the *nature* of the thing approved; I am speaking of certainty or uncertainty in the *approving* itself. To be sure, the intrinsic uncertainty of an *emotional* approving *may* be motivated by an uncertainty as to the nature of the thing approved, that is to say, it may be motivated by a relevant uncertainty of belief. But it *need* not be so motivated, indeed, belief in a thing as such and such may be quite certain, and yet the approving of it for being certainly such and such may be *uncertain*.

If there are indeed emotions or emotion-like feelings that are nevertheless quite without objects, we shall not be concerned with them in our future inquiries. About them, the question of whether they can be in some manner “rational” might still be raised, but it could not be attacked along the line that we are taking. We shall confine our attention to those emotions and quasi-emotions that do relate to something and that relate to something, furthermore, in a manner that is acceptive or rejective or, as we shall say, a *positive* or *negative* manner. Moreover, in order to facilitate comparison between emotion and the belief in respect of the already distinguished features of the latter, we shall concentrate on unmixed positive emotions that are, as emotions, simply certain. And, for the same reason, since we considered only beliefs in particular everyday physical things, we shall now consider only such emotions as relate to things of that sort. To what extent our future ascertainments have in fact a wider application is a question we shall not attempt to answer (though I venture to suggest that at least a few of them hold for directed emotions universally).

Let us then ask ourselves the following question: Is there any circumstance under which a liking of, or a being pleased with, or delighted with, some everyday physical thing has a property analogous to the rationality of a rational believing in such a thing? A property which is, perchance, generically similar to rationality in the sphere of belief and which therefore should itself be termed “rationality”?

It will be recalled that we stated a condition under which believing in a thing as having a particular determination is characterized by a *prima facie* or presumptive rationality *of the highest order*. Is there any circumstance under which a *liking* is characterized by what might also be called “presumptive rationality of the highest order”?

I submit that there is: A liking has *presumptive* rationality and, moreover, presumptive rationality *of the highest order*, just in case the thing liked is *presented* and the determination for which the thing is liked is *also* presented, as *its* determination.

Thus, for example, liking something for its particular color is an emotion that has presumptive rationality of the highest order, if and only if the thing and its particular color are themselves presented. If, on the other hand, the color of the thing was not presented, if, for example, the thing were only vaguely meant as having such and such a color, then a *liking* of it for its color would lack such presumptive rationality. Finding something in the dark, one might indeed like it for its color, even though one only meant the latter quite blindly. And *such* a liking would not have the presumptive rationality that characterizes liking something for its *clearly presented* color.

But there is a possibility of ambiguity here. Suppose that I like something for its color. Then, if my liking is of one kind, it has *prima facie* rationality of the highest order only if the thing and its color are clearly presented in an actual perceiving. If, on the other hand, my liking is of another kind, it has *prima facie* rationality of the highest order regardless of whether the thing and its color be clearly presented in an *actual* perceiving or in a *phantasied* perceiving. In the former case, the liking for the thing is a liking of it as supposedly existing with a particular color; in the latter, the supposition of existence is immaterial to the liking. If perchance the thing and its color are presented in a perceiving, and if this perceiving turns out to be non-veridical, then the presumption of rationality in a liking of the *second* kind is not weakened thereby. For example, if I liked a bird for its colored plumage, and the bird turned out to be illusory, then I might rightly say – “Existent or not, it was a beautiful bird!” Likings belonging to this *general* kind have sometimes been called “aesthetic,” but I doubt the universal appropriateness of that denomination. I may like a fictional person for his bravery and my liking in that case is not aesthetic appreciation but moral approval. On the other hand, if I like a portico because its marble columns are strong enough, but not too strong, for the weight of the stone roof, my appreciation is indeed aesthetic, but (as Schopenhauer pointed out) my appreciation would be destroyed if the building turned out to be actually made of *papier maché*. (Incidentally, it seems more accurate to say that the *prima facie rationality* of my appreciation would be canceled; since, after all, my appreciation could still persist – but as an irrational appreciation).

Detailed analyses are surely required here. But at least it seems already plain that there is a difference between a *prima facie* liking whose presumptive rationality depends on actual *perception* of its object and a liking whose presumptive rationality depends only on *some kind* of presentation of its object.

Assuming that there is such a difference among likings, we shall simplify our next problem by considering only those likings whose rationality does not depend on an actual perception, but would be equally well founded on a clear phantasying of the liked object.

We have indicated that, even in the case of such a liking, the rationality is only presumptive. Why is it only presumptive? If the rationality of a liking

based in fact on a perceptive presentation of the liked thing in respect of the determination for which it is liked, – if, I say, that rationality would be unaffected, even though the whole thing should turn out to be an illusion, then why is that rationality merely presumptive?

It is merely presumptive because the liking of a presented thing for some presented determination does not preclude the possibility of disliking of the same thing for having the same presented determination. A thing may be liked for its presented color. Since the thing's color is presented, and not just blindly meant, the liking has presumptive rationality. But the same thing can nevertheless be disliked, and precisely for its presented color, on another occasion or by another person. In that case, since the disliking is also based on presentation, it too has presumptive rationality. And since it is a disliking of the same thing that is liked, and is a disliking of it for the very quality on account of which it is also disliked, the disliking *conflicts* with the liking, and the presumption of rationality, on one side or the other (or perhaps both sides), is weakened.

But worse than that: in principle we have the possibility that the opposed presumptions of rationality (each being of the highest order) will neutralize one another with the result that neither the likings nor the dislikings can sustain their initial claims. Awareness of this possibility may cause us to despair of actualizing approximations to the ideal of rationality in the emotional sphere. We may take courage, however, when we recall that a precisely analogous possibility exists in the sphere of belief. For in that realm it is likewise possible, *in principle*, that presumptive rationalities of the highest order will completely neutralize one another with the result that no belief or disbelief could sustain its *prima facie* claim to being reasonable. For example, the nature of our sensuous perceivings might be such that in the long run no abiding attitudes of belief or disbelief concerning a particular thing could be reasonably sustained. Nevertheless, the *fact* is that, as already pointed out, most of our sensuous *perceivings* are mutually confirmatory; and thus, in the case of our believings in sensed things, the initial presumptions of rationality are, on the whole, sustained and confirmed.

If we turn once more to the realm of emotions and actually examine those likings that have presumptive rationality, we shall find that, in the case of presumptions of the highest order, *genuine* opposition is by no means *the rule*. And we shall find also, I believe, that so far as genuinely opposed presumptions of that order do occur, they rarely neutralize one another.

If there are many people who disagree with me on this point, there are also many circumstances by which they may have been misled.

In the first place, they may not have seen the precise point at issue. The question does not concern *all* conflicts between liking and disliking, loving and hating, esteeming and disesteeming, approving and disapproving. It concerns only those conflicts that exist between opposite attitudes, each of which

is (as the case may be) a favoring or disfavoring of the same thing for having one and the same determination. If A likes a piece of music for its harmony and B dislikes it for its orchestration, that might be called a disagreement, but it is a disagreement of a sort with which we are not now concerned. Furthermore, the question concerns only those conflicts that exist between opposite attitudes both of which are based on a *presentation* of the object *and of the determination* for which it is, on the one hand, approved, and on the other hand, disapproved. If A's approval of the music for its harmony is based on *hearing and grasping* its harmony, whereas C's disapproval of the music for its harmony is based *only* on another's opinion that the harmony is trite – that is indeed a conflict, but not of the sort with which we are not concerned.

In the second place, I myself may have been misleading due to an over-simplification – which, to be sure, was hardly avoidable at first, but which I must now attempt to correct.

Let us return to our stock example. Is it possible that something be *liked* on one occasion for its presented color, or for its presented sweet taste, whereas on another occasion the same thing is *disliked* for having the same presented color or taste? I said, “The *same* presented color or taste,” and these words indicate the over-simplification. For it is very likely that the thing was approved not for just *its* presented color, but for its presented color, *against a particular background of color*; whereas now it is disliked for its color against a different background. Similarly, the liking of the thing for its sweetness was a liking of it, not just for its sweetness, but for its sweetness presented against a particular “gustatory background,” so to speak. It is altogether probable that the *disliking* is based on a presentation of the sweet taste against a significantly different gustatory background. In the one case, the dish is approved for presented sweetness against one background; in the other it is disapproved for presented sweetness against another background. In short, the presented determinations for which the thing is liked on one occasion and disliked on another are, taken concretely, different determinations. In short, we do *not* have here a conflict between opposite attitudes, both of which relate to something as having one and the same determination.

Incidentally, we may note in passing that we have here another point of analogy between the sphere of emotion and the sphere of belief. Just as the determination on which depends the *likableness* of a thing is inclusive of a background, so the determination on which depends the *credibility* of a thing is inclusive of a background. For example, one cannot say simply that something perceived as a swimming fish is credible or incredible, something seen as a fish swimming *through the waters of an aquarium* would be credible; something seen as a fish swimming through the atmosphere of this room would be incredible. That is to say: in the former case, believing would have presumptive rationality; whereas in the latter case, *disbelieving* would have presumptive rationality.

But, to return to our major theme: when we recognize that the presented *determinations* for which things are liked or disliked are not isolated qualities but are determinations inclusive of a background, we shall find that genuine conflicts among emotional attitudes that have presumptive rationality of the highest order are less frequent than might at first be supposed.

Before leaving this point it should be said that, since I have been considering emotional attitudes toward *realities*, I have mentioned only *real* natural backgrounds. If we cast a momentary glance at ideal cultural affairs, we shall find similarly that when *they* are presented, and liked for presented determinations, the latter are not isolated properties but properties seen against a cultural background. Thus, for example, in the case of hearing a musical composition, the presented determinations for which it is esteemed or disesteemed are not just its own inherent properties, but rather those inherent properties heard against the background of other musical compositions that in one manner or another are also there for the hearer. The nature of that background makes a difference in what one is *hearing*, and a difference therefore in what he is liking or disliking with presumptive rationality.

I shall not develop this point. I trust that, by merely indicating it, I have suggested another consideration that supports my general contention: In the case of presumptions of rationality that belong to the highest order, genuine conflict is exceptional – exceptional in the realm of feeling, just as it is in the realm of belief.

To be sure, it remains true that the liking of a presented thing for having some presented determinations does not preclude dislikings of the same presented thing for having strictly the same presented determination. And consequently we must say that the truly rational liking or disliking would be the one established by a proper weighing of all the likings and dislikings that have such presumptive rationality of the highest order. In short, the truly rational liking or disliking is an ideal. To be sure, we must not expect them to be actualized without genuine conflicts, in consequence of which some presumptive rationalities, even of the highest order, turn out to have been *only* presumptive, because since they conflict with other presumptions that not only have the same dignity but are stronger, – “stronger”: because the presentations on which some emotions are based, and which give them their presumptive rationality, are “better” presentations than those on which opposite emotions are based. For, just as we said that, the better the perception, the stronger the presumption of rationality in the believing, so now we must surely say: the better the presentation, the stronger the presumption of rationality in the liking.

¹When we were considering rationality of belief, I avoided discussion of the conditions that make one perception better than another. Now, however, at least something should be said about what makes one presentation better than another – and makes it better in a respect that strengthens the presumption of rationality in the emotion based on that presentation.

Obviously what matters here is the presentedness of just that determination for which the thing is approved or disapproved. Whether other determinations of the thing are well-presented or poorly presented does not matter. Now in general we may say that the excellence of a presentation depends on the degree of its clarity and the extent to which it is complete. For us the matter of completeness is more significant: We have seen that the determinations for which a thing is liked or disliked, approved or disapproved, includes a background. Accordingly the relevant excellence of presentation will depend in part on the completeness with which that background is presented. Thus, to recur to an earlier example, the excellence of the presentation of those determinations for which a musical composition is esteemed or disesteemed will depend in part on the extent to which a musical background of other compositions is present to the hearer.

The actualizing of an approximation to rationality in one's own feelings toward things would obviously involve giving due weight to the feelings of others, above all to those feelings that are based on the *presentations* of things to others. This means that, if I intend to actualize in myself a more nearly rational feeling toward something, I must in phantasy put myself in the other persons' place and feign that I am seeing the thing as he has seen it. Phantasying myself *seeing* the thing as though *I* were the *other* person, I may also phantasy the feeling toward the thing that I should have if I were he. But, in order to give their due weight to his feeling and mine, a further step is necessary. I must reduce the two feelings to the same level. This might be attempted in either of two ways. First: I might strive to make myself actually as similar to the other person as possible, so that I shall actually see the thing more nearly as he does. This method has grave disadvantages: It can be followed in only a few cases. In no case can it lead to complete success. And in many cases even partial success would be disastrous.

The second method for reducing the two feelings to the same level is that of phantasying my own actual experience as though it were not mine but another's. By this method one places one's own experience and the other's experience in the same relationship to one's actual self. Both experiences are seen on the same plane and at the same distance. Admittedly this method also has its defects. But, of the two methods available, it is the better.

We shall forego further consideration of the method for actualizing feelings that come nearer to being rational. I have mentioned it only in order to show that there *is* such a method, and thereby to establish a presumption that ever closer approximations to the ideal of rational emotion can indeed be actualized.

Before I close, let me enumerate the main points that I have attempted to make:

1. Like beliefs, at least some emotions are directed to objects.

2. Among such directed emotions, at least some are like beliefs in being positive or negative, that is to say, acceptive or rejective of their respective objects.
3. Among such acceptive or rejective emotions, some are based on a presentive consciousness of their objects.
4. Those that are based on presentations of their objects in respect of the determinations for which the latter are esteemed or disesteemed have presumptive or *prima facie* rationality of the highest order.
5. This emotional rationality is analogous to the presumptive rationality of *believing* in something presented.
6. Genuine conflict among emotions that have presumptive rationality of the highest order is, perhaps, no more frequent than among beliefs that have presumptive rationality of the highest order.
7. The rationality of any actual emotion is *only* presumptive; absolute rationality whether in the sphere of emotion or in the sphere of belief, is an unrealizable ideal.
8. Nevertheless, it is feasible to actualize ever closer approximations to the ideal of rationality in the emotional sphere as well as in the sphere of belief.

Notes

1. *Editor's note:* The following two paragraphs were placed between brackets by the author, who also called for skipping to the text that followed those bracketed paragraphs. This may have been to economize on time in an oral presentation.

